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The stream of political and social thought of a small number of
Arab thinkers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which
led to the genesis of Arabism is an important but neglected subject of
study* This essay attempts an interpretive synthesis of the information
and ideas on that topic contained in various distinguished works. The
ideas of this Arab literate elite in urging a revival of social values
and institutions were formulated primarily in reaction to the impact of
the West. The Arabs under consideration were predominantly Syrian and
Lebanese, who provided the most active intellectual and political ferment
in behalf of Arabism. Egypt is not part of our discussion since it did
not partake of the Arab movement during the period covered by this essay.
The main emphasis is on the inseparability of Arabism from Islam
and on the successive phases of Arab reaction to Ottoman rule. Brief
chapters on Ottoman revival and the Young Turk Revolution are included
to provide the necessary background information for a full understanding
of the transformation of Arab attitudes toward the Ottoman Empire, which
shifted from loyalty to discontent to alienation.
I would like to express my deep gratitude to my mentor, Professor
George E. Kirk, who read the essay in draft form and made many helpful
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IBACKGROUND: OTTOMAN EFFORTS TO REFORM
The traditional self-view^ of the Ottoman Empire assumed the superi-
ority of that civilization to all others. This feeling of self-assurance
was an illusion from which the Ottoman Empire was slowly shaken by a
series of humiliating defeats in the eighteenth century to the unbelieving
2
West. The military system and the civil administration of the Empire
were geared to the needs of a society organized for conquest and expansion.
This state structure, which in a sense was a military machine, failed to
3
adjust to the different demands of a society whose frontier was eroding.
The Empire's inability to cope with the internal stresses and dislocation
resulting from a contracting frontier manifested the utter exhaustion of
its old patterns of government.
By the nineteenth century certain members of the Ottoman governing
circles recognized the urgency for change; an urgency that originally
resulted from the global problems of military defeat. They decided that,
in order to defend the Empire against European, chiefly Russian, encroach-
ments, and to restore central control over the provinces, measures must
^This term is used by G. E. von Grunebaum, Modem Isl am: The Search
for Cultural Identity (New York, 1962), passim.
^C. Ernest Dawn, "Arab Islam in the Modem Age," Middle East Journa_l_,
XIX (1965), 435; Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey
(London,
1968), 34-35.
\ewis. Modem Turkey , 27; L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453
(New York, 1958), 135-36.
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be taken to revitalize the Empire's system of government and to modernize
4
certain of its institutions.
To preserve the Empire's integrity, and to meet the needs of the
time, the Ottoman reformers of the nineteenth century promulgated a long
series of laws and regulations, known collectively as the Tanzimat (Re-
organization). The most outstanding Tanzimat reforms were the Hatt-i
Sherif of Gulhane (the Noble Rescript of the Rose Chamber), promulgated
in 1839, the Hatt-i Huroayun (the Imperial Rescript), promulgated in 1856,
and the Constitution of 1876.^
The Hatt-i Sherif , besides proposing reform in the administration
of the provinces, proclaimed principles such as: the security of life,
honor and property; the abolition of tax abuses; a fair system of military
recruitment; fair and public trials of persons accused of crimes; and
equality of persons of all religions before the lav;. The Hatt-i Humayun
reaffirmed the principles of the edict of 1839, and it established, in
specific and categorical terms, the full equality of non-Muslims. In
addition, it promised popular representation in the provincial councils,
as well as other legal and administrative reforms. The Constitution of
1876, the first in Ottoman history, provided a parliament to share certain
legislative functions of the Sultan.
All three major reform documents often have been denounced by
Western critics as deceptive instruments of diplomacy, intended to
^Dawn, "Arab Islam," 435- 3d
\or the texts of the Hatt-i Sherif and the Hatt-i Humayun , see
J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in th e Near and Middle East: A Documentarx
Record (Princeton, New Jersey, 1956), I, 113-16 and 149-53; for a dis-
cussion, see Roderick H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman EmEire^l856::^^^
(Princeton, 1963), 40-41 and 52-57; Lewis, Modeini Turkey, 106-108, 115-16
and 164-66.
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forestall Western intervention by erecting a facade of domestic reform.
This criticism, in part, is valid, since each of the prominent reform
edicts was produced at a time of international crisis, when the Ottoman
Government was in need of conciliating Europe. The Hatt~i Sherif of 1839
was proclaimed when European support was needed to check Muhammad Ali,
the rebellious Pasha of Egypt. The Hatt-i Humayun came immediately at
the end of the Crimean War, when Britain and France had allied themselves
with the Ottoman Empire against Russia. The Ottoman Constitution was
promulgated at the time of the Balkan crisis, when European intervention
seemed imminent.^
To assert, however, that the sole objective of the reform procla-
mations was to appease Europe, is to miss the essential intention of the
Tanzimat. While the reform decrees were precipitated and crystallized
as a result of European pressure, they already had been considered by
the Tanzimat statesmen, who were convinced of the necessity of modern-
ization to preserve the Empire.^ The ultimate purpose of the Ottoman
reform programs, notwithstanding their liberal phraseology and Western
influence, was to restore the integrity of the Empire by strengthening
the powers of the central government and by reintegrating the provinces.
Promises of equality and administrative reorganization had different
implications for Ottoman statesmen and non-lluslin subjects: while for the
latter they meant greater rights and opportunities, for the former they
Seter Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. 1516-1922 (New York,
1966), 171; Lewis, Modern Turkey , 165-66.
^Roderick H. Davison, "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim
Equality in the Nineteenth Century," American Historical Revie_w, LIX, 4
(1953-54), 850-51; Lewis, Modem Turkey , 166.
4.
meant revival of imperial strength through the consolidation of the
Empire's disparate social forces.^ All of the reform edicts were pro-
mulgated from above. Even the Constitution of 1876, like the Prussian
constitutional edict of 1850 on which it was based, did not originate
from a constituent assembly. In a sense, it was an authoritarian document,
enumerating the Sultan's powers and guaranteeing the government wide
jurisdiction in proclaiming martial lav7.
The trend toward autocratic reformism was substantially reinforced
by Abdul Hamid (1876-1908), under whom the whole Tanzimat movement
reached its culmination. The path toward autocratic rule was paved for
him by the Tanzimat '
s
elimination of many of the traditional legal and
social checks that formerly had circumscribed the Sultan's power. Abdul
Haraid extended the scope of the main Tanzimat programs; modernization of
the systems of lav;, civil administration and education; centralization of
authority, implemented with the help of Western techniques such as the
10
telegraph and the railroad.
The Ottoman program of centralization, however, was unable to stay
the erosion of the Empire's boundaries. By the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century, all the Balkan provinces, with the exception of Albania,
were either autonomous, or independent, or else occupied by Western Powers.
^Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age. 1798-1939
(London, 1962), 95.
g
Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent , 172; Lewis, Modern Turkey , 164.
^%olt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent , 172; Hourani, Arabic Thought ,
^^For a detailed account of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-78 and of the
Treaty of Berlin of 1879, see M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question. 1774-
1923 (New York, 1966), 178-219; Stavrianos, Tlie Balkans , 393-413.
Further contraction of the Empire's periphery occurred when Tunisia was
occupied in 1881 by France, and Egypt in 1882 by Britain.
Many of the Tanzimat reforras had been designed with the objective
of forestalling rebellion and keeping the provinces within the Empire*
This was the purpose of programs such as: administrative reform in the
provinces; equality of all subjects regardless of religion; and unification
of all subjects on an equal basis with universal loyalty to the Ottoman
Empire. These projects, however, were unable to counteract the centrifu-
gal force of Balkan nationalism, which was fomented by the diplomatic
maneuverings of the European Powers and by the influence of their political
1
2
ideologies. Serbia and Bulgaria bluntly rejected a scheme proposed
by the Grand Vezir Midhat Pasha in 1872 of converting the Ottoman Empire
13
into a federal state along the lines of Bismarck's Germany. Promises
of corporate equality and universal Ottoman nationality, hov;ever, had
little appeal to the Balkan Christians who desired nothing less than
complete separation from the Ottoman Empire.
Another main factor that militated against the integration of the
various subject nationalities was the intransigence of the Empire's Muslim
population. Arabic speaking Muslims, no less than their Turkish speaking
coreligionists, opposed the program of equality for both religious and
social reasons: some viewed it as an unforgiveable violation of a funda-
mental Islamic doctrine prescribing an inferior status to non-Muslims;
and others, such as administrative officials, tax-farmers, moneychangers
and the like, felt that it would lead to an encroachment on their
economic
^^Stavrianos, Tl\e Balkans, 222, 338.
^-^Davison, "Turkish Attitudes," 853.
6.
14
and political vested interests.
Muslim Arabs, in contrast to the Christian peoples of the Balkans,
considered the Ottoman Islamic Empire their cultural home. The Empire
was, after all, a Muslim state; and moreover, as the most powerful of
the existing Muslim states, it was the protector of Sunni Islam. The
loyalty of Muslim Arabs to Islam, and thus to the Ottoman Empire,
transcended any other feeling of allegiance. They remained uninfected
by the virus of nationalism until the early part of the twentieth century.
Nevertheless, they responded to the stimulus of the Tanzimat , in which
they found the opportunity of reviving Muslim strength and ensuring
Muslim ascendancy in the Empire.
^^
Ibid ., 861 n. 46.
II
DIVERGENCE OF MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN ARAB OUTLOOKS
The Ottoman Empire, after losses of territory in the Balkans and
in North Africa, became predominantly an Asian state, in which the Arabs
of the Fertile Crescent constituted a large proportion of the population^
According to some estimates, the inhabitants of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon
and Palestine numbered about three and a half million at mid-nineteenth
century, and more than five and a half million at the beginning of the
2
First Woj3d War. Muslims, mostly Sunnis, comprised the vast majority of
the total.
The various reform movements in the Arab provinces of the Empire
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century arose in response to
the Tanzimat reforms and to European influence. But to understand the
nature and the objectives of these movements, we must first establish
a distinction of fundamental importance, namely, the difference between
Muslim Arab and Christian Arab outlooks vis-a-vis the Ottoman Empire and
the West. The divergent character of Muslim and Christian Arab political
and social aspirations originated in their fundamentally different
attitudes toward the Ottoman Empire.
A Muslim community (umma ) , joined by a common system of religious
^Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent , 173.
^Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut, 1966),
Appendices A and B.
8.
priiiciples and values, existed within the vast, culturally heterogeneous
Ottoman Empire. It was the single most pervasive element of unity within
the Empire.
To most Muslim Arabs the Ottoman Empire was more than a political
structure; it was the heir of Islamic civilization, the successor of the
great Islamic empires. Indeed, it was primarily a Sunni Muslim state,
based essentially on those most sublime principles of Islam embodied in
3
the Shari'a (the Sacred Law of Islam).
The overriding importance of the Islamic character of the Ottoman
Empire to the Muslim essentially derived from the fact that the dominant
4
feature of his individuality was his status as a believer. His first
loyalty was to Islam, and, as a corollary, to the Ottoman Empire which
was its political embodiment, and to the Sultan who ruled over it.^
Sunni Muslims regarded the Ottoman sultanate as the lineal suc-
cessor of the medieval caliphate. The theoretical justification for
the legitimization of a secular authority over Islam had been formulated
by the jurist al-Mawardi as early as the eleventh century, when he
established the doctrine that a secular ruler, having established effective
power, is to be obeyed in the public interest, as long as he upholds the
principles of the Shari'a , protects Islam, and respects the rights and
authority of the Muslim religious institution.^ Accordingly, the Ottoman
^The Shari'a comprises the Qur' an--divine revelation, and the Sunna--
utterances and practices of the Prophet Muhammad.
^Von Grunebaum, Modern Islam , 181.
^Ibid., 283; Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (London,
1964), 72.
^Hamilton A. R. Gibb, .^fudips on the Civilization of Islam (Boston,
1962), 160.
Sultan, as the strongest and most competent defender of Sunni Islam,
was esteemed by the Muslim faithful as the supreme head of the Ottoman
Islamic Empire.^
Muslim Arab recognition of the Sultan as head of Islam implied
acknowledgment of his authority in all aspects of individual and social
life. Islam, like classical Judaism, claimed the complete allegiance
of the faithful, uniting "religion" and "politics". It was more than a
religion in the current interpretation of the word. It was a cultural
8
unit, based on a comprehensive system of law and values.
Muslim Arabs, besides formally adhering to the Empire on religious
or philosophical grounds, were bound to it for material reasons. They
benefited from the extension of state-operated educational institutions,
railroads and other government-sponsored projects of modernization.
Moreover, their political and social dominance was ensured by the existing
governmental structure. They constituted the largest number of local
administrative and judicial officials in the Arabic-speaking provinces,
9
and some of them were among the closest advisers of the Sultan.
Another factor that bound Muslim Arabs to the Ottoman Empire was
their special position in Islam, which, to some extent, was officially
recognized. It was based on facts such as, the Qur'an is in Arabic,
the Prophet was an Arab, and the original Muslims were Arabs. Arabic
maintained its privileged function as the official language of religion
and law in the Empire. The descendants of the Prophet, the ashraf , were
^Hourani, Arabic Thought , 27.
^E. I. J. Rosenthal, Judaism^_ai^^ (London, 1961), 29-32;
von Grunebaum, Modern Islam , 67, 244, 305.
\ourani, Arabic Thought , 262; Ma»oz, Ottoman Reform, 247.
10.




Renowed Arab families and religious leaders of the provincial
cities fostered Arab pride in their language, cultural identity, his-
torical memories, and unique role in Islam. Therefore, they preserved
and, in a sense, encouraged Arab consciousness.^^ However, it was
strictly a cultural kind of "national" consciousness, lacking political
overtones. The idea of nationalism, as a well-defined movement with
political objectives, was incompatible with the overriding loyalty of
Muslim Arabs to Islam and the Ottoman Empire--ob jects that transcended
nationalism. Political allegiance to a country or nation was unknown:
territorial loyalty was limited to one's city or quarter, and ethnic
loyalty to one's family or tribe. "So alien was the idea of the territorial
nation state," wrote Bernard Lewis, "that Arabic has no word for Arabia,
12
while Turkish, until modern times, lacked a word for Turkey." Aspi-
rations among Muslim Arabs for separate political existence from the
Ottoman Empire were not crystallized until the First World War.
Muslim Arabs were, and consciously felt, very much a part of the
Empire because, among other things, it was primarily a Sunni Muslim state,
because it supported Muslim predominance, and because it esteemed their
religious leaders and acknowledged their special status in Islam. The
Empire, however, meant something quite different to Christian Arabs.
Though the latter accepted the Arabic language and were part of Muslim
culture in the broad sense, yet they were not fully incorporated in
10
Hourani, Arabic ThoughJ:, 33, 260-61.
Ibid .
^\ewis. The Middle East, 72-73; Lewis, Modern Turkey,, 329
11.
that culture.
Since the beginning of Islam, non-Muslims had been classified and
treated as second-class subjects. This practice was perpetuated by the
Ottoman Empire until the mid-nineteenth century, when it was formally
abolished by the Tanzimat edicts. However, Muslim refusal to endorse the
Tanzimat program of equality prolonged many of the traditional disabilities
to which non-Muslims were subjected.
There were still cases of forced conversion and cases in which
Christians were prohibited from building or repairing churches. After
the discriminatory poll-tax ( jizya ) was eliminated by Ottoman reforms,
it was replaced by another unequal tax, the badal , which was levied on
all non-Muslims in lieu of military service, even though they were not
permitted to serve in the army. Ottoman promises of more equitable
representation in government and of legal equality were net fully carried
out: Christians remained seriously under-represented in the provincial
and state councils; evidence presented by a Christian against a Muslim
13
was frequently discounted in Muslim courts of law. Courts often went
as far as summarily condemning a Muslim in favor of a non-Muslim, rather
14
than accepting the latter' s evidence. In one particular case, for
example, "the court endeavored to persuade the (Muslim) offender to
plead guilty and to submit to a slight punishment, rather than to
establish a precedent opposed... to their faith."
Besides being denied rights specifically granted to them by the
13
Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform , 189-99.
^^IJbid-, 197.
^^Quoted in Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform , 196, from the British Foreign
Office Archives, dispatch from the series F. 0. 78, from the consulate
in Damascus.
terras of the Tanzlmat > Christians also were subjected to occasional
acts of oppression and violence. Their attempts to exploit their rights
under the Tanzimat aroused bitter ^&aslim antagonism, since Muslims refused
to recognize non-Muslim equality. Sometimes Christians, however were
responsible for provoking Muslim hostility for reasons such as: their
open defiance of traditional Islamic social regulations; their reluctance
to pay the obligatory badal ; their repeated violations of the consular
treaties; their close ties to certain European Pov/ers with which the
Ottoman Empire was at odds; their economic ascendancy made possible
16
through foreign trade and European support.
Anti-Christian activities v;ere the result of the traditionalist
Muslim cultural reaction to the idea of non-Muslim equality. It must
be emphasized that the division betv;een Muslim and non-Muslim was the
basic social framev;ork in the Islamic world, transcending linguistic and
ethnic differences. Conservative Muslims held that the Ottoman Empire,
as an Islamic society animated by Islamic doctrines, was obligated by
religious precept to maintain the supremacy of Islam, and therefore, to
preserve the inferior status of non-Muslims. Moreover, they feared that
their traditional position of political and social dominance would be
subverted if Christians enjoyed equal rights. What it meant for a
Muslim to give up his superior status is described by Bernard Lewis in
the following terms:
To give up this principle of inequality and segregation
required of the Muslim no less great an effort of
renunciation than is required of those Westerners who
are now called upon to forego the satisfactions of
16
Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform , 226-32.
^^Ibid., 227.
13.
racial superiority. Of the two prejudices, that of
the Muslim against the infidel had stronger roots
both in tradition and in morality. The Muslim could
claim that he assigned to his inferiors a position
of reasonable comfort and security; he could more-
over claim that his discrimination related not to
an accident of birth but to a conscious choice on
the most fundamental question of human existence,^
The obstacles against the full incorporation of Christians in
Ottoman society were too great to be overcome by Tanzimat aspirations
of Ottoraanism (Osmanlilik)--the objective of uniting all subjects on
the basis of equality under Ottoman sovereignty. The Muslim mind,
conditioned by a history of Muslim dominance within Islam, was not yet
prepared to accept the absolute equality of non-Muslims. Muslim in-
transigence, however, was not the only barrier against achieving Ottomanism
Some sections of the Christian Arab population did not v?ant to be
integrated in the Ottoman system, but instead they desired autonomy under
19the protection of certain European countries.
Various impersonal forces perpetuated Muslim-Christian disparity.
The effects of centuries-old Ottoman discriminatory administration in
government, law, justice and taxation, compounded with the consquences
20
of serai-autonomous existence in the millet , had estranged Christians
from the Ottoman Government. The millet system of sel f-administering
communities, drawn along religious lines, accentuated Christian conscious-
ness of their separate status, and it militated against intercommunal
^^Lewis, Modem Turkey , 107.
^^Davison, "Turkish Attitudes," 864; Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform , 199,
218.
^^Hamilton A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West
(London, 1950-57), I, 212n; "Milla," Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam , 380.
14.
contact and Ottoman "national" solidarity Christians had attained a
viable social existence within the limits of their own millets , in which
they observed their own laws, practiced their own customs, and cherished
their own traditions. For all these reasons they regarded the Empire
22
as alien to their society. It was an attitude moulded by centuties,
and as such, it was too firmly established to be substantially changed in
the space of several decades of reform.
The tension between Muslim Arab and Christian Arab was revived by
the Tanzimat ferment, and it was intensified by the impact of the West.
Christian Arabs, connected to their European coreligionists through
missionary schools and through commercial activity, were able to accept
Western ideas and practices v;ithout that disquieted feeling v;hich
23
characterized Muslim borrowing from an unbelieving, inferior culture.
The work of Christian traders of Damascus, Aleppo, and the coastal
towns of Lebanon brought them into frequent contact with European life.
The predominance of Arabic-speaking Christians in the trade field is
explained by a number of factors: the traditional Muslim view of trade
was one of contempt; Christians, prior to the Tanzimat , could not legally
acquire land in Syria; Christians had a knowledge of European languages
24
and the advantage of consular protection. The range of the consular
treaties was extended to give protection to Ottoman subjects, as well as
^^Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society , I, 212, 216, 217, 256; Albert
Hourani, Minorities in the Arab World (London, 1947), 19-22; A. L. Tibawi,
••The Cultural Aspect with Special Reference to Egypt and Syria," Religion
in the Middle East , ed. A. J. Arberry (Cambridge, 1969), II, 547-48.
^^Sari' al-Husari, Lectures on the Growth of Nationalist Tliought (in
Arabic), (Cairo, 1948), 17'^80.
^^Hourani, Arabic Tliought , 95.
^^Ibid., 57.
15,
European aliens. European consuls even supported attempts by Christian
Arabs to improve their material conditions, and to achieve greater
25
rights and privileges. Consequently, many Christian Arabs had closer
ties with, and were more favorably disposed to the West than to the
Ottoman Empire.
Another main channel of Western influence was missionary and
educational activity. Whereas the European experience of merchants,
travellers, and European-educated priests and scholars was limited to a
relatively small number of people, missionary v;ork, on the other hand,
reached large and various sections of the Christian Arab population.
France had been the traditional protector of Arabic-speaking Christians
who were under the headship of the Papacy, namely, the Maronite, Melkite
and Latin Catholics. Russia, by a dubious interpretation of the Treaty
26
of Kutchuk Kainardja (1774), claimed the right around mid-nineteenth
27
century of protecting the Orthodox Christians. France was the undis-
puted leader in the founding of schools among Arab Christians, particularly
the Lebanese. During the second half of the nineteenth century various
other Western countries, notably Britain and the United States, expanded
28
into the missionary and education field in the Arab provinces. As will
be shown, it was from an American college in Lebanon that a high level
of intellectual ferment emerged and spread to various other regions of
the Empire.
2S
Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform , 217.
^^For the text of the treaty, see Hurewitz, Dipl omacy in the Near
and Middle East , vol. 1 (Princeton, N. J., 1956), 54-61.
^^Hourani, Arabic Tliought , 39-40; Ma'oz, Ottoman Reform , 215-16.
^^George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York, 1946), 92-93.
16.
Lebanon was the country whose cultural and geographical circumstances
enabled it to receive the largest share of Western ideas and practices.
The Maronites of Lebanon, its dominant Christian sect, had carried on
relations with the West for centuries. Their union with Western
Catholicism began at the time of the Crusades, and it was consolidated
by their Concordat with Rome in 1736. In the seventeenth century they
established direct relations with France, which, as the most powerful
Catholic country of Europe, claimed the right to protect the Maronites
29
and other Catholic communities. Lebanon's religious contact with
Europe opened the door to European cultural ideas and to greater commercial
exchange, which was abetted by Lebanon's favorable geographical location.
Western influence in Lebanon was accelerated following the Organic
30Regulation of 1861, which was drafted by an international commission
at the end of the 1860 civil war. It established Mount Lebanon as an
autonomous region under a Christian governor appointed by the Porte;
thus it implicitly acknowledged and safeguarded the predominance of the
31
Christian element. Subsequently, commercial and missionary activity
increased. More schools were founded by the Western missions, and even
the indigenous schools were organized along European lines. The crowning
achievement of Western education was the establishment of the Syrian
Protestant College by the Americans in 1866, later to become the American
University of Beirut, and Saint Joseph's University in 1875 by the French.
The Syrian Protestant College, in which Arabic was the language of
^^Hourani, Arabic Thought , 39-40, 55.
^^For the text of the Organic Regulation, see Hurewitz, Diplomacy,
vol. 1, 165-68.
^^Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent , 242.
instruction, played a leading part in the revival of the Arabic language,




Western currents of thought inspired the Lebanese literary revival
of the second half of the nineteenth century. Certain Lebanese Christians,
prominently Nasif al-Yaziji, Faris al-Shidyaq, and Butrus al-Bustani,
cultivated an ardently intense love of Arabic language and literature.
With their exceptional mastery of Arabic, they endeavored to make the
necessary linguistic modifications so as to make it a suitable medium
for the expression of modem ideas.
Both Shidyaq (1804-1887) and Bustani (1819^1883) formed close ties
with the American Protestant missionaries and gained a knowledge of
Western languages. Eventually, both men converted from the Maronite
faith to Protestantism, at least partly because of the greater latitude
Protestantism offered for the expression of secular ideas. In his
writings Shidyaq admired the social cohesion and the technological
progress of the European countries. He realized that religious affili-
ations had to be transcended in order to achieve national unity.
Like Shidyaq, Bustani was strongly influenced by European culture.
He taught that selective borrowing of European ideas and techniques was
essential for a revival of Arab civilization. According to him, the
first objective of the Arabs should be to attain national unity on the
basis of equality and religious freedom. His firm belief that national
solidarity was a prerequisite for social progress was manifested in at
least two of his actions: he named the school he founded the National
^^Antonius, Arab Awakening , 42-43; Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in
History (New York, 1967), 453-54.
18.
School, in which Arabic and the modern sciences were taught; the motto
he selected for his best known periodical was the following statement
attributed to the Prophet, "Love of country is an article of faith".
Bustani's national idea, however, did not suggest the creation of an
Independent pan-Arab state. He accepted Ottoman sovereignty as necessary
for the political stability needed by the Arab provinces for their social
well-being. Bustani was primarily a cultural nationalist, appealing to
common Arabic traditions, customs, language and literature, as an antidote
to the social limitations of sectarian life. His life time objectives,
as teacher, translator, author, journalist, lexicographer and encyclo-
pedist, were to revive Arabic as the medium of enlightenment, to transcend
sectarianism, and to encourage regional social solidarity within the
33framework of the Ottoman system.
Tendencies toward secular thought among Lebanese Christians re-
ceived tremendous impetus as a result of the growth of the periodical
press, which carried their ideas far beyond the borders of Lebanon. Until
the 1860's, there had been virtually no Arabic newspapers; the only
papers of importance had been those published by the Ottoman Government
in Constantinople and Cairo. But during the last three decades of the
34
nineteenth century, the increase in the number of printing presses, and
of the Arabic reading public, provided Lebanese Christians with the
opportunity of publicizing and disseminating modern thoughts. Down to
^^The information in the three preceding paragraphs is taken from
Hourani, Arabic Thought
,
95-102; A. L. Tibawi, "The American Missionaries
in Beirut and Butrus al-Bustani," Middle Eastern Affairs , 3 (1963), 156ff.
^^^Itie printing press had been traditionally in the hands of Christians
Muslims hesitated to adopt its use out of objection to reproducing the
Qur'an, the word of God, by movable type instead of calligraphy.
about 1900, Arabic periodicals, whether published in Beirut, Cairo, or
Constantinople, vere predominantly in the hands of Lebanese Christians,
most of whom were educated at the Syrian Protestant Col lege.
The theme of many of the major Arabic periodicals of the late nine-
teenth century was secularism. Indeed the first significant Arabic
newspaper with wide circulation, Shidyaq's al-Jawa'ib (1860-1883), pro-
pounded fresh ideas and discussed the advantages of European society.
Another pioneer newspaper, but one that advocated Westernized reforms in
more explicit terms, was al-Jinan
, founded by Butrus al-Bustani in 1870.
It argued that the social and political institutions of the Arab lands
must be regenerated through reforms in the systems of education and
administrative government, and by the separation of religion from
politics.
The two most influential and best known of these Lebanese periodical
were al-Muqtataf and al-Hilal
. The former was founded in Beirut in 1876
by two teachers of the Syrian Protestant College, Ya'qub Sarruf and
Faris Nimr. However in 1885, just one year before the Ottoman Governmeit
suppressed al-Jinan, al -Muqtataf moved to the comparative freedom of
38
Cairo (under British control), where it was renamed al-Muqattam . Al-
Hilal was founded in Cairo in 1892 by Jurji Zaydan, who also had studied
at the American Protestant College. Both of these periodicals handled
many of the same subjects already treated by Shidyaq and particularly
35
Hourani, Arabic Thought , 97.
•^^Ibid .. 98-99.
^^Ibid ., 263.
•'^Martin Hartraann, The Arabic Press of Egypt (London, 1899), 10-11,
69-70; Hourani, Arabic Thought , 245-46; Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of
Arab Nationalism (Beirut, 1966), 59 n. 3.
20.
Bustani-^topics such as: the importance of science or progress, and the
role of law, morality, and religion in modem society. However, their
value existed not so much in original observations as in educating a
growing reading public in Western ideas, with the result that these ideas
39were steadily becoming commonplace. They prepared the ground from
which other public advocates of Westernized reform were able to advance.
The debate between religion and science at the end of the nine-
teenth century was brought into sharper focus by other Christian Arabs
such as Shibli Shumayyil and Farah Antun. Both men accepted the European
idea that the general welfare should be the chief goal of society and
the state, and that science is indispensable for achieving that end.
Shumayyil had studied medicine at the Syrian Protestant College and in
Paris before settling in Egypt, where he became a frequent contributor
to al-Muqattam and other similar periodicals. In his writings he
asserted that the Ottoman Empire lacked the basic components of a healthy
society, namely, liberty, justice, and primarily scientific knowledge.
For Shumayyil, who had translated a German commentary on Darwin in the
1880s, a viable social organization could be sustained only adapting it-
self to the changing circumstances. But since the society best fitted
to survive was the one in which all of its members worked for the general
good, therefore social solidarity must be achieved by shifting an
individual's loyalty from his particular religion to a single national
entity.
Farah Antun, another Lebanese journalist, published a book on the
philosophy of Ibn Rushd in Cairo in 1903. He contended that the modem
^^Hourani, Arabic Thought , 246-47.
^^Ibid., 248-51.
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age was one of science and secular philosophy, in vhich religious
dogmatism was medieval and timewom. He advocated national unity and
the separation of religion from politics as the sine qua non of freedom,
justice, equality, progress, and true civilization.^^
The Arabic periodical press played a decisive part in publicizing
the idea of secularism as an antidote to the decay of Ottoman social
institutions. The primary function of the Arabic press was to persuade
public opinion of the advantages and indeed the necessity of Westernized
reform. It did not advocate action, nor did it even propose a definite
program for social improvement. Its treatment of certain controversial
political and social issues remained general out of fear of precipitating
Hamidian repression.
The influence of the Arabic press, though relatively great, must
not be overexaggerated . The periodical writers were predominantly
Christians, whose ideas appealed primarily to Christians, especially
those who had imbibed secularist thought with their knowledge of English
and French. Since the Christians existed on the margin of Ottoman
society, they had a certain objective insight into the inadequacies of
that society, and they were more inclined than Muslims to accept external
ideas. Their frequent discussion of and deep interest in the idea of a
secular state was based on their aspirations for equal rights and a
42
greater share in government. Muslim Arabs, on the other hand, V7ere
scarcely influenced by ideas seeking to change the status quo that
supported the predominance of their social institutions. They rarely





Muslim schools, or the new Ottoman state schools.
Nevertheless, the Arab literary revival did not leave all Muslim
Arabs untouched. Arabic periodicals frequently featured articles
celebrating the literature and culture of the Arabs, and thus they
enlivened Arab consciousness. Some Muslim Arabs began to become aware
of certain cultural distinctions between them and the Ottoman Turks. A
few of them, dissatisfied with Ottoman misgovernment
, also began to
canvass certain notions of reform. They desired greater material
improvements and more power in provincial affairs. However, they were
not amenable to doctrines of secularism. The integrity of Islam was
still the first principle of their allegiance. Moreover, prior to the
Young Turk ascendency after 1908, the number, effectiveness, and influence
of reform minded Muslim Arabs was extremely small. The vast majority
of them continued to support the Ottoman Empire as the home and protector
of Islam. They looked upon Europe, rather than the Empire, as an unwanted
intruder.
When a Muslim Arab reform movement eventually developed (as will be
seen in the next chapter), Islam, not secularism, played the dominant
role. Muslim reformers advocated a rejuvenation of Islamic institutions
and a return to the doctrines of early Islam as prerequisites for social
rehabilitations
.
Religious loyalty, \^ith its broad social ramifications, was a
fundamental issue dividing Muslim Arab and Christian Arab reformers.
While both groups agreed on the necessity of social reform, they differed
as to its ultimate purpose. Whatever the political objectives of Muslim
Arab reformers were, and whatever feeling of Arab consciousness they had,
/ ^
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they still remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire and that they entertained
no notions of separatism.
National feeling among Christian Arabs, however, was becoming wide-
spread in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Butrus al-Bustani's
advocated Syrian autonomy in the form of a secular community.
Including Muslims, Christians and Jews, and embracing the vilayet s of
Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut, and the autonomous
_saniaks of Mount Lebanon
and Jerusalem. This idea was supported mainly by Orthodox and Protestant
Christians educated at the American and European mission schools. Even
though many of them were Lebanese, they favored an autonomous Greater
Syria over an independent Lebanon, because a Lebanese state implied the
domination of the French and their Maronite Catholic proteges.
Beyond their general aspiration for autonomy, few Christian Arabs
had a plan for action or even a program of political objectives. The
first Arab political program to be recorded was drafted by a secret
society that had been founded in Beirut in 1875 by five Lebanese
Christians from the Syrian Protestant College. In 1880 this secret
society posted in Beirut, as well as other major towns of Syria, anonymous
placards accusing the Ottoman Turks of injustice and misgovemment , and
exhorting the Arabs to obtain, by force if necessary, the following
objectives: the autonomy of Syria in union with Lebanon; the recognition
of Arabic as an official language; the removal of censorship and other
types of repression; peace-time military service only in one's local
region.
While the leaders of the Beirut society sought above all the
^^Hourani, Arabic Though t, 274-76.
^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 79-84
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independence of Lebanon, they felt that they needed Muslim Arab support,
and that therefore, they had to offer a broader program. They appealed
to the idea of Arabisra as the common bond uniting Muslim and Christian
Arabs; they exploited the dissatisfaction of reform minded Muslim Arabs
with Ottoman misrule; they included the autonomy of Syria in their
political demands. Furthermore, as members of the Masonic Lodge of
Beirut, the leaders of the Beirut society managed to persuade a few of
their fellow Muslim members to join their activities .^^
Ihe influence of the secret society, however, was slight. Its
membership remained very small, and it was confined predominantly to a
few educated Lebanese Christians. It decided to dissolve itself in
481882 or 1883 out of fear of Hamidian repression. Perhaps its greatest
significance was that it foreshadowed the eventual development of better
organized Arab separatist movements.
The attempts of the Lebanese Maronites to bring full independence
to their autonomous region, and to create a Christian state oriented to
the West, represent the only mature "nationalist" movement among Arabs
49during the last decades of the nineteenth century. This movement,
however, should not be misinterpreted as an Arab nationalist effort. It
was the work of marginal Arabs, whose pro-French policies and exclusively
regional patriotism precluded support either from Muslim Arabs or from the
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To sum up, there were at least three divergent directions of an
Arab movement at the turn of the century: Lebanese Maronite nationalists
seeking to establish an independent state; groups of Lebanese and Syrian
Christians favoring a secular, autonomous Arab community; Muslim Arab
reformers contending that an Arab revival was necessary for the cultural
rejuvenation of Islam.^^ These movements, with the exception of the
Lebanese nationalists, were embryonic, and it was not until the conse-
quences of the Young Turk ascendancy were felt that they came to life.
They comprised small groups of individuals whose main work centered on
publicizing, rather than acting on their objectives. Moreover, they
aimed above all to secure reform and possibly autonomy within the
Ottoman Empire. Only a small minority, almost entirely Christian,
sought independence. It must be emphasized that the vast majority of
Muslim Arabs supported the Ottoman Empire as a Muslim state.
50




MUSLIM ARAB REFOR>I THOUGHT
Muslim reformers during the last quarter of the nineteenth century
were aroused by the modernizing spirit of the Tanzimat and by the in-
creasing rate of VJestern involvement in Ottoman affairs. Their pride
and confidence in the integrity of the Empire were shattered by a number
of setbacks at the hands of Europe, such as: the abuse of capitulatory
privileges; increasing commercial and financial control of European
creditors over certain Ottoman affairs as a result of the expanding
Ottoman debt; insurrections of Christian elements in the Balkans, V7hich
were spurred by Russia's pan-Slav policies; Russian attacks on Muslim
domains in Central Asia; and French and British encroachments in North
Africa.^ Muslim reformers felt that the Empire's viability was
threatened externally from Europe, and internally from the discontent
among the very Christian subjects to whom the Tanzimat had made a number
2
of concessions, in the hope of integrating them in the Ottoman system.
Consequently, these reformers became disillusioned with the Westernizing
program of the Tanzimat on account of its failure either to satisfy the
^Albert Hourani, "Near Eastern Nationalism Yesterday and Today,"
Foreign Affairs
,
XLIII, 1 (October, 1963), 127.




Christian minorities, or to mitigate European intrusions.^ Nevertheless,
they were still affected by the reform mood, as they fully recognized
the need for social change and improvement. They began, however, to
speak of modernization along strictly Islamic lines, as opposed to
Western.
Late nineteenth century notions of reform among Muslins revolved
about the integrity of Islam. The problems of and projected solutions
for Islamic decline were formulated in religious terras, rather than
4
secular or national. in contrast to Christian Arab secularizers
,
Muslims were not conditioned to separate religion from social life. For
them, Islam was the source and ideally the raison d'etre of their
civilization; it was inseparable from the various other manifestations
of social activity. Therefore, whatever cultural changes they contemplated
depended upon their willingness to reform the Islamic foundation of that
culture. They felt that a revival of Islam was a necessary prerequisite
for political and social change. Indeed, the question of the Islamic
religion represented a thread linking virtually all of the modern Muslim
thinkers, notwithstanding their differing notions on precisely how Islam
should be reformed.
Jamal al-Din al -Afghani
Islamic reformism received a reverberating stimulus from the activity
3
Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism (Los Angeles,
1968), 22-23.
4
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (London, 1964), 96.
28.
of the redoubtable Jainal al-Din al-Afgh^ (1838-1897).^ The political
aspects of the reform campaign of al-Afghani, who V7as originally a
Persian, were often dissimilar to the political implications of Muslim
Arab thought. But his ideas on Islamic revival had a direct and
important influence on Muslim Arab reformers, especially the school of
Muhammad Abduh.
Through his writings and teachings, al-Afghani asserted that for
Islam to regain its proper place in the world it needed to return to
the original and genuine principles of early Islam, and to eschew the
later corruptions responsible for its stagnation. Hie idealization of
primitive Islam as a golden age, and as normative, was accepted by most
of al-Afghani's followers, and it played a central role in Muslim reform
thought.^ Islam had been great in the past, argued al-Afghani, because
the faithful adhered to the basic principles of the Qur'an and the
teachings of the Prophet. When Muslims had firmly abided by the funda-
mental truths of their faith, their interpersonal and community
relationships were truthful and trustworthy. Al-Afghani held that the
sublime qualities engendered by right religion formed the basis of social
cohesion and a healthy community. He idealized the strength and unity
of Islamic society in the age of the caliphs, and he ascribed its
military successes and rapid growth to the force of social solidarity
produced by the true believers. He concluded that Islamic civilization
again could become united and could florish, if the faithful would live
^For the life and thought of al-Afghani, see Charles C. Adams, Islam
and Modernism in Egyp_t (New York, 1968), 4-17; E. G. Browne, .The Persian
Revolution (London, 1910), ch. 1; I. Goldziher, "Djamal al-Din al-Afghani,"
Encyclopedia of Islam , (2nd ed.), II, 416-19; Sylvia Haim, Arab Nationalism:
An Anthology (Los Angeles, 1962), 6-15; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in
the Lib(i7al Ag e, 1798-1939 (London, 1962), ch. 5;.Keddie, An Islam^lx^Respons
^Wilfred C. Smith, Islam in Modern History (New York, 1957), 56.
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their religion as it ought to be lived,^
In his "Refutation of the Materialists", published in Paris in 1881
as an outgrowth of his controversy with Ernest Renan, al-Afghani pro-
pounded the thesis that Islam contained the roots not only for social
solidarity, but also for social amelioration and progress. The ideology
of progress was a European product,^ which al-^Afghani borrowed chiefly
from Guizot, whose History of Civilization in Europe had been recently
translated into Arabic. Following the Enlightenment theory that progress
was based on reason, al-Afghani tried to show in his essay that Islam
was a rational religion, and moreover, the only religion conducive to
the law of progress.
The Islamic religion is the only religion that censures
belief v/ithout proof and the following of conjectures;
reproves blind submission; seeks to shov; proof of things
to its followers; everywhere addresses itself to reason;
considers all happiness the result of wisdom and clear-
sightedness; attributes perdition to stupidity and lack
of insight; and sets of proofs for each fundamental
belief in such a way that it will be useful to all people.
It even, when it mentions most of its rules, states their
purposes and their benefits.^^
Al-Afghani 's feverish attempts to portray Islam as a religion fully
compatible with the demands of a modern society help to indicate the
^Keddie, An Islamic Response , 38 and 78.
^The policy of reinterpreting certain Western ideas or practices
as original Islamic products was used by al-Afghani and other Islamic
modernists in order to fit them in their exclusive system of reconstruction
from v;ithin, and also to make them more acceptable to conservative
Muslims. On this point see G. E. von Grvmebaura, Modern Islam: The Search
for Cultural Identity (New York, 1962), 122.
^Keddie, An Islamic Response , 172n.
^^Quoted in Keddie, Islamic Response, 172.
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central importance and indispensabil ity of Islam to Muslim reform
activity. His political activities in behalf of pan-Islam cannot be
understood apart from his Islamic consciousness. Indeed, the overall
appeal of his pan-Islamic campaign was, as the name suggests, basically
religious in nature.
Al-afghani did not originate the doctrine of pan-Islam, although
he did become its leading advocate in the last tv70 decades of the nine-
teenth century. Pan-Islam developed primarily in reaction to European
imperialism. The first ideologists of pan-Islam apparently were a
group of intellectuals called the Young Ottomans, who in the 1870s
called for Islamic unity based on the sublime provisions of the Shari'a
.
Their reaction against European encroachments was accompanied by a
domestic reaction against the "heretical" Westernizing programs of the
Tanzimat
.
which seemed to aggravate Ottoman disunity by giving greater
latitude to the separatist-minded Christian elements, and by acquiescing
in the growing influence of Europe, particularly conspicuous in economic
affairs. Their ideas may well have influenced al-Alfhani, who had
knowledge of Osraanli and who had been in Constantinople from 1869 to
1871. He shared the conviction of the Young Ottomans that Islam declined
because it abandoned the precepts of the Shari'a, and because it could
not defend itself against Western military and cultural inroads.
The need for strong Islamic unity was dramatized by the distress
felt among Muslims over the Empire's inability to respond to the appeals
^^Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal,
1964)
,
216-22; Nikki R. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-National ism, " Journal
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291-93; E. I. J. Rosenthal, Islam in the Modern National State (Cambridge,
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for help from their Central Asian brothers, who were subjugated by Russia
in the 1860s and 1870s. The nascent pan^-Islamic sentiment received an
impetus from the examples of the successful Italian and German unifi-
cation programs. However, it should be emphasized that pan-Islam was
radically different from European nationalist movements, in that it was
based on religious and not national loyalties. Pan-Islamisra was an
ideological response to European aggression which fully comported with
existing Muslim loyalties, whereas the notions of pan-Turkism or pan-
Arabism did not even exist as yet.
The emphasis on Islamic solidarity sharpened the focus of Muslim
loyalty on the Ottoman Sultan, as the most powerful ruler in the Islamic
vorld. Sultan Abdul Hamid eagerly responded to the pan-Islamic climate
as he increasingly put forward the claim to be Caliph of all Sunni
Muslims. Pan-Islam gave him the desired opportunity of consolidating
1
3
his own position as head of a more firmly united Ottoman Islamic Empire.
The trend toward greater Islamic identification was moving in the
direction of al -Afghani, who had been advocating defensive cultural
solidarity against European incusions through a re-emphasis of genuine
Islamic principles. Al-Afghani had developed a lifelong hatred of foreign
encroachments, particularly British, since his stay in India at about
the time of the Indian mutiny. He assailed British imperial activities
^ Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," 293-94.
The thesis of Keddie's "Pan-Islam as Proto-National ism" exaggerates the
importance of pan-Islam in leading to local nationalisms, while on the
other hand it minimizes the incompatibility of national loyalties with
Islamic loyalties, which were supranational.
^^Berkes, The Development of Secularism, 255; Keddie, "Pan-Islam
as Proto-Nationalism," 20; Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire," 294.
^^Keddie, Islamic Response , 11-12.
16
32.
in Egypt while he was there in the 1870s, and later in Paris through al-
Urwa al^Wuthqa (The Strongest Link), the newspaper that he and Muhammad
Abduh published in 1884*'^^
To illustrate al^Afghani's anxiety over Islamic weakness in the face
of European imperialism, let us consider his exhortations for direct
action. He appealed to the traditional Islamic right of removing
rulers incapable of protecting the Islamic peoples against foreign
incursions, when he proposed, while in Egypt, that the Khedive Ismail
should be assassinated for misgovemment , and again when he actually
encouraged the assassin of Nasir al-Din Shah to commit his deed in 1896,
In view of al -Afghani's attitude, we can imagine the burning
enthusiasm with which he took advantage of the pan-Islamic mood, such
that he became probably its greatest publicist. He labored by pen and
speech to bring about a union of all Muslims under the Sultan-Caliph, in
order to present a united and formidable front against Europe. Recognizing
that the Islamic religion v;as the common, fundamental clement binding
Muslims, al-Afghani advocated the strengthening of this bond as the most
effective force of producing social cohesion and imperial strength.
These objectives were reflected in the "Refutation of the Materialists"
and in the articles of al-Urwa al-Wuthqa , both of which attempted to
engender pride in the social virtues and glories of Islam. Al-Afghani
implied that when religion was the focal point of Muslim life, the
1
8
Islamic civilization flourished and excelled.
l^ibid. , 20 and 24.
^^Haim, Arab Nationalism, 8-9.
^^Ibid., 9.
^^Keddie, Islamic Response , 83.
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Al-Afghani's ambition was to ingratiate himself with Sultan-Caliph
Abdul Hamid, who was already predisposed against European interventions,
and furthermore who had already accepted the leadership of the pan-Islamic
cause. Al-Afghani hoped to influence Abdul Hamid to adopt the pan-Islamic
proposals that he had drafted. In 1885, he suggested an alliance between
Afghans, Persians, Turks, Egyptions and Arabs, with the help of his
traditional foe Britain, to counter Russian expansion at the expense of
the Muslims of Turkestan. In 1892, he presented a pan-Islamic project
to Abdul Hamid, and consequently he was invited to Constantinople in that
year. This project, in contrast to the earlier one, was directed mainly
against the British. It proposed an alliance of all Muslims, including
those of India, to expel the British from Muslim domains, and to block
further Western encroachments against the Islamic world.
Al-Afghani's pan-Islamic schemes never materialized, and the movement
itself never got off the ground, as it remained more an expression of
a striving than a systematic plan for action. Yet his significance is
to be found not in concrete achievements, but rather in the tone he set
for many subsequent Muslim reform thinkers. He brought Islamic cultural
consciousness into focus, and he helped to accentuate Islamic resentment
of European power. He advocated the feasibility of enlightened reform
from within, as opposed to blind imitation either of accepted patterns or
of European ways. His ideas on cultural revival and a renevjed Islamic
Empire appealed to the nascent spirit of Muslim defensive cultural
1 9
Nikki R. Keddie, "The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdul-
Hamid II," Middle Eastern Studies
,
III, 1 (October, 1966), 52-65; Jacob




solidarity. Sylvia Haim has aptly sun-onarized al-Aghani's seminal role
in the cause of Islamic reform:
What al-Afghani did was to make Islam into the mainspring
of solidarity, and thus he placed it on the same footing
as other solidarity-producing beliefs. His political
activity and teaching combined to spread among the
intellectual and official classes of Middle Eastern Islam
a secularist, meliorist, and activist attitude toward
politics, an attitude the presence of which was essential,
before ideologies such as Aran nationalism could be
accepted in any degree. It is this which makes al-Afghani
so important a figure in modern Islamic politics.
Muhammad Abduh
Many of al-Afghani 's ideas on Islamic cultural rejuvenation were
taken up and disseminated by the more profound Muhamrnad Abduh (1849-1905),
who became probably the most influential modernist in Islam. A native
of Egypt, Abduh had been a pupil of al-Afghani during the latter'
s
years in Cairo in the 1870s, and he helped al-Afghani publish al-Un<ra
al-Wuthqa in Paris in 1884. While under al-Afghani 's direct influence,
Abduh had been politically active by v;ay of writing anti-European
articles, and of supporting by pen and word of mouth the al-Arabi revolt
(1881-1882) against the Khedival Administration of Egypt and its ties with
23
the British.
^^Keddie, "The Pan-Islamic Appeal," 50; Smith, Islam in Modern
History , 54-56.
^^Haim, Arab Nationalism , 15.
^^For the life and thought of Abduh, see Adams, Islam and Modernism ,
18-176; Osman Amin, Muhammad Abduh , trans. Charles Wendell (Washington,
1953); Hourani, Arabic Thought , ch. 6; Malcolm H. Kerr, Islamic Reform:
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Abduh's predominant concerns, however, were eventually focused
upon religious, ethical and social matters. His two most important
works are basically religious: Risalat al-Tawhid (Treatise on the Unity
of God ), which is his major theological work, and Al-Islam wa al-
Nasraniyya ma'al-Ilm wa al-Madaniyya (Islam and Christianity Compared with
Respect to Science and Civilization ) , which is a defense of the greater
compatibility of reason and revelation in Islam than in Christianity.
In both works he argued that reason and the Islamic religion are mutually
corroborative, non-contradictory paths to the truth, and moreover that
Islam encourages the development of free inquiry and science.
Abduh declared that Islam must adapt itself to the modern scientific
outlook if it wished to preserve its viability and to enter into the
spirit of social progress. But he opposed blind imitation of the v;ays
25
of European life as a cure for the ills of Muslim society. Instead
he idealized early Islam, as al-Afghani had done, and he advocated a
restoration of its pristine truths as the preparatory phase for a general
Islamic revival. Abduh contended that, since Islam had become vitiated
partly as a result of the practice of tagl id--the blind acceptance of
doctrines from generation to generation on the authority of the religious
community, it was essential to re-introduce as a counter-measure the
right of i itihad --free and independent investigation. For justification
of the right of ijtihad , he appealed to the most inviolable source in
Islam, the Qur'an: "How far those who believe in tagl id are from the
^'^Adams, Islam and Modernism , 127-43; Kerr, Islamic Reform , 108-110.
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guidance of the Qur'an. It propounds its lavs in a way that prepares us
to use reason, and makes us people of insight... It forbids us to
submit to taqlid ."^^
Abduh's objective of interpreting Islam, through the method of
exclusive selection, as a religious system conducive to free in-
vestigation was to show that it contained the necessary formulas for
religio-social modernization. What was needed to break contemporary
Islamic inertia, and to once again s^t Islam on the path of progress,
28
was a revitalization of the truths of the Qur'an.
Abduh's focus on the incomparable value of the principles of
primitive Islam led to this important development: emphasis on the
unique role of the Arabs in Islam. Abduh came to stress the Arab
character of the Qur^an and the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. He
taught that a thorough and precise knowledge of the Arabic language, as
well as of the history and practices of the Arabs, were prerequisites
for understanding the intention of the Book. Accordingly, he went on to
conclude that a revival of Arabic studies was essential to discover the
truth of Islam, and thus to regenerate Muslim society.
Abduh maintained that true Islam was the original product of the
Arabs, who furthermore had proficiently preserved it. He connected
the spread of the practice of taqlid and social obscurantism with the
ascendancy of Turkish rule. He even dated the beginning of the decline
of Islam to the time when the Abbasid Caliph, probably al-Mutasim
^^Quoted from Abduh 's Commentary on the Qur'an in Adams, Islam and
Modernism , 130.
^^ Ibid ., 142-43.
^^C. Ernest Dawn, "From Ottomanism to Arabism: The Origin of an
Ideology," The Review of Politics , XXIII, 3 (July, 1961), 389-90.
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(833-42), introduced the use of Turkish mercenaries who eventually seized
power and established military despotism. He held that the Turks,
lacking a full understanding of Arabic language and culture, could not
grasp the true meaning of the Qur'an and the Sunna. They preserved
their political autocracy by closing the door of ijtihad, and by making
their subjects accept beliefs and doctrines that were often extraneous
to the spirit of the Shari'a
. He concluded that the Turkish tradition
of despotic government and unintelligent theology have continued through
Ottoman rule. Although supporting the Ottoman Empire as the most
effective protector of Islam, nevertheless Abduh, arguing on similar
grounds as al-Afghani, asserted that if the ruler's actions were unjust
and contrary to the principles of the Shari'a , the people have a right
31to depose him in the interests of public welfare.
Abduh was the first influential Muslim Arab thinker to juxtapose
Arabs and Turks, and to compare the former favorably against the latter.
This policy was accepted and amplified by certain other important Muslim
Arab reformers. It marked an early step in the emergence of Arab consciousness.
Abduh' s preconceived case for the inviolability of strict Islamic
doctrines was based, however, on a precarious foundation. He fallaciously
projected on the Turks the responsibility for closing the door of ijtihad
with its consequential negative ramifications, a responsibility that
actually belonged to the orthodox Muslim religious leaders. In the
eleventh century the scholastic theologians succeeded in establishing
Ash'arism as the officially recognized theology of Sunni Islam. It is
^^Haim, Arab Nationalism , 21.
^^Hourani, Arabic Thought , 150, 151, 158; Kerr, Islamic Reform ,
149.
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an authoritarian system, demanding the passive, unquestioning acceptance
of its interpretation of Divine Revelation. It marked the end of free
inquiry and speculation in theology, as well as in philosophy and in the
natural sciences. "^^
Rashid Rida
Muhammad Abduh's ideas on the necessity of a Muslim Arab revival
for religio-social reform were adopted and elaborated by his devoted
pupil. Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935).^^ Rida was born near Tripoli.
Lebanon, of a family that belonged to the ashraf class, that is. those
believed to be descended from the Prophet. He was deeply influenced by
al-Urwa al-Wuthga
, particularly in its emphasis on the social implications
of the Islamic religion. Rida's cause, one that was becoming recurrent
in the Islamic modernist movement, v;as the regeneration of Islamic
culture. This furnished the underlying theme of his journal al-Manar
,
which he established in 1898 in Cairo, where he remained for the rest
of his life.
Rashid Rida adopted the formula for reform already seen in al-
Afghani and Abduh: the necessity of a return to the principles and the
practices of the great ancestors or elders (salaf ) , as a remedy for the
maladies of Islamic social institutions, and as a prerequisite for
progress and amelioration. All three modernists used the past as the
^^H. A. R. Gibb, Mohammedanism (New York, 1962), 118; Bernard Lewis,
The Arabs in History (New York, 1960), 142-43.
^-^For the life and thought of Rida, see Adams, Islam and Modernism ,
ch. 8; Hourani, Arabic Thought , ch. 9; Kerr, Islamic Reform , chs. 5 and
6.
^^von Grunebauiii, Modern Islam, 279-80n.
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authoritative and archetypal model for reform. It represented to them
the quintessence of Muslim power and glory achieved under the pristine
rulership of the Prophet and the first four caliphs, or the Rightly-
Guided Caliphs. ITiey ruled out modernization along Western lines as a
possible alternative to emulation of the past for at least two reasons:
much of the reform energy originally sprang from the Islamic cultural
reaction to Western intrusions ; Islamic principles enjoined on true
Muslims the obligation to eschew the alien ways of unbelieving peoples.
These thinkers also excluded as a basis for reform the beliefs and
practices of the long intervening centuries between classical Islam and
the present, since those centuries already had been indicted for the
predicament of contemporary Islam. A passage from Professor G. E.
von Grunebaum's Modern Islam illustrates the similarity between Islamic
and Western views of the medieval ages:
The view of history which is implied in this attitude
bears close resemblance to that of the West from the
Renaissance onward, when the Middle Ages were
depreciated as an interruption of the true growth of
civilization and a direct connection v;as established
between antiquity and the modem era, with the inter-
vening period decried as a regrettable and shameful
lapse.
The salaf iyya ^Zthe movement to return to the ways of classical Islam-
can be interpreted as the reaction of a grovjing body of Muslim reformers
to a feeling of inadequacy. In a sense, they replaced their receding
^^ibid., 32-33.
^^Ibid., 112.
^^This concept was not entirely new in Islam. The Wahhabi movement
In Arabia in the eighteenth century urged a revival of the original truths
of the first generation of Muslims, and the elimination of the later
unorthodox innovations. See Hourani, Arabic Thought, 37-38.
40.
feeling of cultural superiority, which was shaken by external encroachments
and internal decay, with the dangerous illusion that contemporary needs
and aspirations could be fulfilled by recapturing the exemplary past.^^
Implicit in this attitude was a fundamental contradiction between the
adherence to a law of progress and the belief that the first centuries
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of Islam marked the highest level of history,
Rashid Rida became the unrivaled intellectual leader of the
salaf iyya movement. He was a Hanbalite, the most conservative of the
four schools of Muslim theology, and he was a stricter salaf
i
than al-
40Afghani and Abduh. He put much sharper focus than they on the period
of the first four caliphs, to the virtual exclusion of the medieval
orthodox Muslim religious institution. The logical implication of this
was that Rida*s ideal Islam was unambiguously the Islam of the Arabs.
For him, the essential, indeed the only truths of Islam were contained
in the Qur'an and formulated in the doctrines of the Prophet and the
Companions. The subsequent beliefs and rituals were superstitious,
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mystical and corrupt accretions deviating from genuine Islamic precepts.
Rida said that Muslims, to emerge from their stagnant situation, should
return to the practices "of the early days of the first four caliphs,
whose Sunna, together with his own Sunna, the Prophet commanded Muslims
to hold fast to, and they should lay aside everything that has been
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introduced into Islam that is contrary to that practice."
^®von Grunebaum, Modem Islam , 108 and 123.
^^Ibid. , 118n.
^^Haim, Arab Nationalism , 20-21.
^^Adams, Islam and Modernism , 188-91; Hourani, Arabic Thought_, 230.
^^Quoted in al-Manar from Adams, Islam and Modernism , 191.
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Rida, like Abduh, supported the sultanate out of necessity as the
most capable defender of Islam, but he denied its legitimacy as a caliphate,
which, he asserted, belonged de jure to the Muslim religious institution.
The Ottoman sultan could not interpret correctly the aims of the laws
and traditions of Islam because he did not have knowledge of the Arabic
1 43language. Consequently, what was needed to restore right religion
and to regain the spirit of early Islamic greatness was a regeneration
of Arabic culture. In focusing on the necessity of an Arab renascence
to rebuild Islamic society, Rida came to stress the priority of the
Arabs over the Turks. In his article "The Turks and the Arabs", published
in al-Manar in 1900, Rida stated:
It is in the countries which were conquered by the Arabs
that Islam spread, became firmly established and
prospered. Most of the lands which the Turks conquered
were a burden on Islam and the Muslims, and are still
a warning of clear catastrophe. I am not saying that
those conquests are things for which the Turks must be
blamed or criticized, but I want to say that the greatest
glory in the Muslim conquests goes to the Arabs, and
that religion grew, and became great through them; their
foundation is the strongest, their light is the brightest,
and they are indeed the best umma brought forth to the
world. ^5
It should be understood that Rida, in praising the Arabs at the
expense of the Turks did not advocate or even envision an Arab national
movement toward political separatism. He continued to reaffirm the
traditional hierarchy of loyalties in which Islam held priority over
Arabism, and in which all Muslims were brothers regardless of ethnic or
^^Hourani, Arabic Thought , 240.
^^Dawn, "From Ottomanism to Arabism," 391-92.
^^Quoted in Haim, Arab Nationalism , 22-23.
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linguistic differences.^^ For him, as for most Muslims, the Islamic
vorld was a single cultural unit represented by the Ottoman Empire.
When he criticized the Ottoman authorities and praised the Arabs, it was
because he felt that the Arabs were better Muslims.
Nevertheless, Rida's juxtaposition of Arabs and Turks had repercussions
not originally intended by him. It exposed to some minds that the Arab
community was ethnically and historically different from the Turkish,
that the original umma was Arab, and that perhaps the Arabs should be
recognized as a separate nation.
Abd al -Rahman al-Kawakibi
Rashid Rida's theories on the pre-eminence of the Arabs in Islam
were given fuller content in the words of Abd al -Rahman al-Kawakibi
(1849-1902). Kawakibi, who was of the ashraf class, worked as a public
official and a journalist in his native Aleppo until he was imprisoned
for speaking out against the local Ottoman authorities.^^ H6 found it
expedient to move to Cairo in 1898, where he joined to the circle of
Abduh and Rida, and contributed articles to al-Manar
. His diagnosis of
the ills afflicting Islam, which were generally those already expounded
by Abduh and Rida, are incorporated in his Tabai' al-istibdad (The
49Characteristics of Tyranny ), and Umm al-qura (another name for Mecca).






^^George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York, 1946), 95; Hourani,
Arabic Thought
, 271.
^^These works are not original. Tabai' al-istibdad was virtually
lifted from the Italian writer Alfieri's Delia Tirannide (1777), and Umm
al-qura was probably adapted from W. S. Blunt's The Future of Islam (1882).
For a discussion of this matter, see Sylvia G. Haim, "Al fieri and al-
Kawakibi," Oricnte Moderno, XXXIV (1954), 321-34; idem., "Blunt and al-
Kawakibi," Oriente Moderno, XXXV (1955), 132-43.
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He found the chief causes of Islamic decay inherent in the introduction
of alien and deviant beliefs. He followed the path of his predecessors
in launching assaults on the Turkish experience in Islam, on vhich he
placed much of the responsibility for the deplorable condition of Islamic
culture.
However, Kawakibi attacked Turkish despotism much more severely and
acrimoniously than Rida and certainly than Abduh. Moreover, he drew a
sharper distinction between Arabs and Turks. He concluded that, since
the whole history of Turkish rule down to the Ottomans^^ was responsible
for stifling Islamic progress, the task of regeneration must be assumed
by the Arabs-- the true, original Muslims.^^ Ihe reasons Kawakibi adduced
for asserting that the Arabs, especially those of the Arabian Peninsula,
are the only possible instrument to effect the restoration of right
religion are the following: Islam originated with them and is deeply
rooted among them; they are its foundation and its most zealous adherents;
they have preserved its purity and eschewed alien corruptions brought
in by foreign races; and their tongue is the language of the Sacred
Qur'an.^^
Although Abduh and Rida had already assailed Ottoman religious and
social obscurantism, and had called for an Arab revival, Kawakibi was
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the first writer, other than Ibn Abdul Wahhab in the eighteenth century,
to deny outright the religious authority of the Ottoman Sultan. Kawakibi
^^Kawakibi, like other Muslim Arab aplogists, often passed over the
distinctions between earlier Turkish Islamic dynasties and the Ottoman
Empire.
^^Haim, Arab Nationalism , 26; Hourani, Arabic Thought , 272.
^^Sylvia G. Haim, "Blunt and al-Kawakibi," Oriente Moderno , XXV (1955),
133-34.
^^On the Wahhabis see footnote 37 above.
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demanded that the caliphate rightly belonged to an Arab of the line of
Quraish (the tribe of Muhaimad) to be installed at Mecca. The Arab caliph
would have religious authority over all Muslims, but, contrary to early
caliphal rule, his political authority would be limited to the Hijaz.
Each regional entity of the Ottoman Empire would have administrative and
political autonomy.
The "national" suggestions of Kawakibi's ideas on the pre-eminence
of the Arabs have been exaggerated by two prominent writers on Arab
nationalism, namely, George Antonius and Sylvia Haim.55 Kawakibi's
assertions that the Ottoman sultans were not legitimate caliphs, and
that the caliphate belonged to the Arabs and ought to be returned to
them, were absolutely not intended as Arab nationalist appeals, nor were
they received as such.^^ His explicit statement that the caliph would
have only religious authority over a multinational Islamic world precluded
the notion of a pan-Arab state. The caliph would be a kind of Islamic
pope rather than an Arab Islamic emperor.
Moreover, Kawakibi's reasons for assailing the Ottoman Empire
stemmed more from self-interested than ideological motives. Kawakibi
belonged to the class of the ashraf
,
which, by virtue of its descent
from the Prophet, historically had enjoyed privileged economic and social
^^Haim, "Blunt and al -Kawakibi ," 132; Hourani, Arabic Thought ,
272-73.
^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening
,
95-98; Halm, Arab Nationalism
,
27 and 29.
^^Sati' al-Husri, Lectures on the Growth of Nationalist Thought
(Cairo, 1948), passim . Likewise the Wahhabis, though rejecting the
authority of the Ottoman sultan, appealed to Islamic and not Arab
solidarity; see Hourani, Arabic Thought , 38.
^5.
advantages. 57 However, the elevated position of the ashraf gradually
was being eroded by the effects of Ottoman centralization during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whereby "the Ottoman sultans
began attracting to themselves all the elements of power hitherto
diffused among a crowd of landed families, tribal shaikhs, and privileged
CO
corporate orders."^ Opposition of ashraf elements to the Ottoman
government was particularly acute during the reign of Abdul Hamid,^^ who
resolutely pursued centralization by extending the network of railroads
and the system of state-supported schools in the Arabic speaking provinces,
and by demanding that Osmanli Turkish replace Classical Arabic in the
government schools and administrative offices.
More particularly, Kawakibi had first hand experience of the loss
of familial privilege when the family of Abdul Hamid's court astrologer
and religious adviser, Abu'l-Huda al-Sayyadi, successfully challenged
the Kawakibis for the post of naqtb al-ashraf (head of the ashraf) of
Aleppo. This, in spite of the fact that the religious families of Aleppo
doubted Abu*l-Huda*s claim to be of the ashraf .^^ This event as well as
Kawakibi 's prison term indicate that one of his principal reasons for
rejecting the authority of the Ottoman caliphate lay in his personal
antipathy tovjard the Hamidian regime.
A discussion of Kawakibi and the ashraf class is located in John
Batutu, "Some Preliminary Observations on the Beginnings of Communism
in the Arab East," in Jaan Pennar (ed.), Islam and Communism (Munich and
New York, 1960), 52-55; George E. Kirk, "The Arab Awakening Reconsidered,"
Middle Eastern Affairs
,







^^Peter Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1 922 (New York, 1966),
257; Hourani, Arabic Ittought, 271.
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It had been Ottoman encroachments upon the traditional pre-
rogatives of the ashraf class that constituted the underlying cause
not only of Kawakibi's dissent, but moreover the dissent of many other
important Arab figures of that class. Significantly, many of the
prominent anti-Ottoman radical dissidents, including Rashid Rida,
Sayyid Talib of Basra, and Sharif Husain of Mecca, were from the ashraf
class. They were not pan-Arabists in the political sense suggested
by Antonius and Haim, but rather they v/ere devotees of the old order
seeking to preserve above all the local autonomy of the Arabic speaking
towns, in order to maintain their own privileged interests. Nevertheless
they as well as certain other Arab reformers gave air to certain ideas
which came to be acted upon in the early part of the twentieth century:
ideas such as the incompetent and illegitimate rule of the Ottoman
sultans, the priority of the Arabs in Islam, and the justness of an Arab
caliphate and local Arab autonomy.
Nineteenth century Muslim Arab reformers were not political
activists. The fundamental character of their reform thought was religio
social. Their quasi-national ideas, advanced at the close of the nine-
teenth century, fell largely on unresponsive ears, as the vast majority
of Muslim Arabs still passively acquiesced in Ottoman authority. Their
emphasis on Arabism was still intimately connected with the religious
faith, and as such it lacked nationalist overtones. An Arab nationalist
movement of well-defined political aims did not maturely develop until
the second decade of the twentieth century, as a reaction to the Turkifi-
cation policies of the Young Turks, and as a result of the stimulus
it
^^Batutu, 0£. cit . , 52.
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received from World War I and the post-war settlements. Actually, the
most vehement political opposition to the Ottoman Government at the end
of the nineteenth century and the first years of the twentieth came not
from the Arabs, but rather from the Turks themselves.
62
Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut.
1966), 73. ~
IV
THE YOUNG TURK REVOLUTION AND THE FIRST ARAB SOCIETIES
Domestic and foreign events of the last quarter of the nineteenth
century stimulated disenchantment toward the Ottoman Government among
elements of the Turkish military colleges and the Westernized bureaucracy
Turkish reformers of the Western tradition became estranged from the
ruling dynasty after Abdul Hamid in 1877 had prorogued Parliament and
scrapped the Constitution of 1876. Fear of the regime's incapacity to
hold the Empire together mounted in the wake of recurrent Balkan insur-
rections, the disastrous consequences of the Russian-Turkish War, the
French occupation of Tunisia in 1881, and the establishment of the
British protectorate over Egypt in 1882.
The first organized opposition to Abdul Hamid was formed in 1889
by a group of students at the Imperial Military Medical School in
Constantinople. The express purpose of their association was to over-
throw Abdul Hamid. They were inspired by Western ideas of modernism,
emanating largely from Paris. This opposition movement spread rapidly
from the Military Medical School to other government higher schools in
Constantinople, among them the Military Academy, the Naval Academy, the
Civil College, and the Engineering School. But before long, certain
conspirators fell under the v;atchful eye of the Hamidian espionage system
As a consequence, some of them found it expedient to leave the country.
-48-
49.
and by 1894-95 a steadily growing number escaped to Europe, chiefly
Paris.
In Paris these refugees established contact with an already assembled
small group of Ottoman anti-Hamidians
. Chief among them were Khalil
Ghanem and Ahmet Riza. Ghanem was a Lebanese Maronite from Beirut who
had been a delegate to the first Turkish Parliament in 1878, but had
fled to Paris after Abdul Hamid had prorogued the Parliament. In Paris
he founded the journal La Jeune Turque. Ahmet Riza's amenability to
Westernized reform was rooted in his social background. His mother was
Austrian and his father was a man of Western tasts, and he himself had
received part of his education in France. Together with Ghanem and a
number of other exiles, Ahmet Riza published the paper Mashwara
(Consultation), which first appeared in 1895, and which became the organ
of these "Young Turks." Their program called for the overthrow of
Abdul Hamid, social and political reforms for the entire Empire, the
Ottomanization of the disparate social forces of the Empire, and the
preservation of Imperial integrity.^
Meanwhile in Constantinople, discontent with the Hamidian government
was increasing. The British ambassador in Constantinople reported in
November 1895 that placards assailing Abdul Hamid 's rule were posted on
2
the chief mosques of the capital. A series of arrests were made on
suspected seditious elements. Finally, the malcontents decided to
attempt a coup d'etat on August, 1896. However, the projected coup was
uncovered before it was able to materialize, and exile to the remote
^Ernest Rarasaur, The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of
1908 (Princeton, 1957), 14," 17, 21-25.
Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism (Beirut, 1966),
74.
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parts of the Empire became the fate of the conspirators.-'
Paradoxically, it was not the failure or the consequences of the
projected coup of 1896 that immobilized the activities of the Young
Turks; rather it was their own decision to abandon the struggle against
the Sultan. The defection of the very popular Young Turk leader Murat
Bey and his followers in 1897 paralyzed the anti-Hamidian movement for
several years. They exchanged their revolutionary aims for Hamidian
promises of reform from above and of a guarantee of complete amnesty
for all political prisoners and exiles. Furthermore, Murat Bey believed
that his aspirations for a new Islamic Empire might be realized by
4
attaching himself to the Sultan.
When the Young Turk movement began to regain its strength after
1900, its activities were concentrated outside of the Ottoman Empire,
since internal agitation was precluded by the inhospitable political
climate of Constantinople. And after 1900, the Young Turk reformers
were forced to give more and more attention to the vociferous grievances
of the subject nationalities, particularly the national ist^inspired
Armenian and Balkan peoples.^
Among the Arabs, nationalistic feeling was scarce, since the vast
majority of Muslim Arabs remained loyal to the sultan-caliph as a matter
of religious principle. Nevertheless, there were a few Arab opposition
societies existing prior to the Young Turk Revolution that are worthy of
mention. Thore was the "Turko-Syrian Reform Committee," whose objectives
^Ramsaur, The Young Turks , 26, 30-33.
^Ibid .
,
45-50; Ahmed Amin, The Development of Modern Turkey as
Measured by its Press (New York, 1914), 68.
^Ramsaur, The Young Turks , 61-62.
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as its name implies, vere for reform and greater harmony between the
Syrian provinces and the central government.^
In 1903 a young group of Muslim Arabs of Damascus founded the
Halaqat Dimashq al-Saghira (the Damascus Circle). While this society
had been established primarily to promote the study of Arabic language
and literature, it increasingly came to concern itself with political
issues, such as decentralized government and the recognition of Arabic
as an official language in the law courts and in the government schools
and offices of the Arab provinces. Some of these young men went on to
study in Constantinople, where in 1906 a few of them founded the secret
society JamHyyat al-Nahda al-Arabiyya (the Society of the Arab Awakening),
and then helped to establish a branch in Damascus. In fact, Damascus
remained the center of the activities of the Jam' iyya* s young Damascene
intellectuals, in spite of its foundation at Constantinople. The
Jam' iyya disseminated knowledge of Arab history and literature, and it
covertly discussed political problems and aspirations of the Arab
provinces.^ The importance of these first Arab societies lies less in
their actual influence, than in their indication of emerging tendencies
toward greater Arab consciousness.
Another Arab group of pre-Young Turk Revolution years, but one with
clear and well-defined nationalist aims, was the Ligue de la patrie arabe ,
founded by Najib Azouri, a Syrian Christian who had studied in Paris.
The Ligue's program was conspicuously contained in Azoury's Le Reveil de
la Nation Arabe
,
published in French at Paris in 1905. It advocated the
^Ibid. , 63-64.
^Elie Kedourie, "Hizb,'* Encyclopedia of Islajn (2nd ed.), Ill, 519;
Al-Amir Mustafa al-Shihabi, Al -Qawmiyatu ' 1 Arabiyya (Cairo, 1958-59),
52 and 55.
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creation of a new Arab Empire extending from the Tigris and the Euphrates
to the Suez, and from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea. It called
for the division of spiritual and temporal power, by urging the creation
of an Arab constitutional monarchy based on religious freedom and political
equality, as well as the creation of a "spiritual" caliphate with
religious authority over the Islamic world. Egypt lay outside the
boundaries of Azoury's Arab nation, since, as he maintained, it belonged
not to the Arab but to the Berber family, and also since they were
o
separated from the Arab Empire by a natural frontier.
• It appears that the Ligue had little direct influence among the
Arabs, and its short-lived monthly periodical, L' Independence Arabe
,
9
ceased publication in about 1907. Reasons for the meager influence of
the Ligue seem apparent. For one thing, Azoury wrote in French, at
Paris, not in Arabic or in his native land. His political views were
representative of some Christian Arabs, but hardly any Muslim Arabs.
His bid for the separation of civil from religious sovereignty was
anathema to the Muslim system of law. His clamor for complete Arab
independence fall largely on deaf ears, even among Christian Arabs.
Although small groups of the latter, mostly Lebanese, wanted regional
independence, almost none of them shared the idea of a centralized pan-
Arab state. As for the Muslim Arabs, the bulk of them still acquiesced
in Ottoman rule, while small numbers v/ho agitated, did so for reform and
improvement within the Ottoman Empire, and not independence.
^English translation of the nationalist manifesto contained in Le
Revei l is found in Sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Los
Angeles, 1962), 81-82.
^Albert Hourani, Arabic Thou ght in the Liberal A?^e, 1798-1939
(London, 1962), 278; Kedourie, "Hizb,'' 519.
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The initiative for radical political change came not from the Arabs
or from any of the other subject nationalities, but from the Turks. A
new feature of the Young Turk movement after 1900 was the program
espoused by Prince Sabaheddin, a relative of the Sultan who had emigrated
to Europe with his father and brother in 1899. Sabaheddin contended
that the interests of the Ottoman Empire could best be served by .
compromising with the national aspirations- of the subject nationalities.
To Ahmet Riza's policies of centralization and Ottomanization, Sabaheddin
opposed a program for an Ottoman federation in which the provinces would
have a great measure of autonomy. In their quest for reaching some sort
of an agreement and unity on the question of action against Abdul Hamid,
and on the problem of the nationalities, the Young Turks arranged two
conventions, both in Paris, one in 1902 and the other in 1907. Repre-
sentatives of the Riza and Sabaheddin factions, as well as Arabs, Kurds,
Greeks, Armenians, Albanians, Circassians, and Jews attended both
conventions. There was agreement on the deposition of Abdul Hamid and
the need for a constitution. But there was no unanimity on the question
of the place of the various nationalities in the Empire.
Ottoman attempts at compromise and conciliation were almost bound
to fail. The Christian nationalities, especially the Armenians, felt
no attachment to a Muslim state headed by a Turkish sultan. They would
not be conciliated by Sabaheddin' s proposals for an Ottoman federation,
as they sought complete independence from the Empire.
^^Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal,
1964), 311 and 313; Hourani, Arabic Thought , 265.
^^Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1968), 204;
Ramsaur, The Young Turks , 72.
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The Turks, for their part, were becoming increasingly intransigent.
The opposing forces advocating Ottomanization on the one hand, and
decentralized government on the other ,. became polarized after the Paris
Convention of 1902. During the next few years the Riza faction became
predominant, for its program of centralized government and the amalgamation
of the various races was attuned to the nascent spirit of Turkish
nationalism which was then emerging within the Empire. '^^ The nationalistic
activities among the Armenians and among the Balkan peoples, the
recurring Russian encroachments in the Balkans, the rumors of dis-
memberment at the hands of the European powers, had embittered many
1
3
Turks, who now distrusted notions of decentralization, preferring to
guard the Empire's integrity through consolidation. The increasing
participation of the military in the Young Turk movement meant greater
support for centralism.
It was among Turkish military elements, rather than the Young Turk
exiles or the almost defunct opposition in Constantinople, that the anti-
Hamidian movement became most active by 1906-1907. In 1906 revolutionary
cells were established among Turkish officers serving in provincial
regions. A group of disaffected officers formed in 1906 in Damascus
the secret group "Fatherland and Freedom Society." From Damascus the
society expanded to Jaffa and Jerusalem, and thence to Salonika in
Macedonia which became the society's center of activity. By 1907 new
groups were organized in various other regions of Macedonia and Anatolia.
15
^^Ramsaur, The Young Turks , 93.
^^Zeine, The EmerRence , 77.
l^Lewis, Modern Turkey , 204-205.
^^Ibid., 205-206; Ramsaur, I1ie Young Turks , 95-99
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The causes of disenchantment in the Turkish officer ranks stemmed
from both patriotic and personal motives. The twin fear of particularism
and imperialism cried for a refashioned government and a rejuvenated
army. The dishonest system of promotion, the intolerable espionage
network, the shabby uniforms and obsolete weapons, and the fact that pay
was constantly in arrears, were some of the causes of grievance on the
part of the officer corps.
In 1907 the Salonika group joined the Paris group in a society
known as the Committee of Union and Progress. Their fundamental purpose
was to depose Abdul Hamid and to restore the constitution. However,
there was very little coordination between the groups. Organizational
work and plans for action in Salonika moved far ahead and independently
of the Paris group.
However, it was not premeditated plans but rather spontaneous
military strikes for adjustment of grievances that ultimately produced
the Young Turk Revolution. In 1907 a wave of mutinies had erupted in
Anatolia, and by 1908 they were spreading in Macedonia. After the Sultan's
delegate entrusted with the task of putting down the mutiny in Macedonia
had been killed, the mutiny spread rapidly from one unit of the Tliird
Army Corps to the next. The Sultan's attempts to turn back the incipient
revolution through military repression, espionage, and bribery failed.
Tlie Committee of Union and Progress came out and supported the mutineers'
bid for the restoration of the constitution. Yielding to the Young Turk
1
8
pressure, Abdul Hamid re-procl aimed the 1876 Constitution. Freedom
l^Lewis, Modern Turkey , 205-206, 115-17.
^^Ramsaur, TIt^ .'^'^""^^ Turks, 122-29.
l^For a survey of the events culminating in the Younc Turk Revolution,
sec Lewis, Modern Turkey , 205-209; Ramsaur, Hie Young Turk s,
94-139.
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of speech, press, and assembly, the abolition of the espionage system,
and full amnesty of all political exiles were promised. The joyous
and hopeful reaction among the Empire's minorities is illuminated in the
oft-quoted words of Henry H. Jessup: "The whole empire burst forth in
universal rejoicing. The press spoke out. Public meetings were held,
cities and towns decorated, Moslems were seen embracing Christians and
Jews, and inviting one another to receptions and feasts. "^^ Publications
of the time in the Arabic-speaking provinces expressed praise and
confidence about the new order of things.
The new Parliament comprised 288 deputies, of which 147 were Turks
21
and 60 were Arabs. However, from the start Abdul Hamid had been
plotting to dissolve the Parliament and revoke the Constitution. He
was supported by former government officials dismissed by the Committee
of Union and Progress, and also conservative Muslims, some of whom
22
called the Committee an association of atheists, Jev;s and Freemasons.
In April 1909, Abdul Hamid made an unsuccessful attempt at a counter-
revolution. The Parliament and the Senate deposed him in favor of his
23
brother, who became Sultan Muhammad V.
The Young Turk Revolution was in a sense a nationalist movement of
l^Henry H. Jessup, Fifty-Three Years in Syria (New York, 1910), vol.
2, 786.
20Zeinej The Emergence , 79.
^^Feroz Ahmad, The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress
in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914 (London, 1969), 28.
^^Edwin Pears, Forty Years in Constantinople (London, 1916), 257-58.
^^For an sccount of the counter-revolution of 1909 and of the
deposition of Abdul Hamid, see Pears, Forty Years in Cons tantinople, chs.
18 and 19.
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Muslim Turks, whose aim was to overthrow the incompetent regime of Abdul
Hamid, and to replace it by a reform government which would better cope
with foreign and domestic troubles. Arabs, as well as the other subject
nationalities, played a very small role in the 1908 Revolution. The
ascendancy of the nationalist wing of the Young Turks over the "liberal,"
pro-decentralization faction dictated that the fate of the minorities
would be Ottomanization, rather than regional autonomy. Furthermore,
the nationalists, whose instrument was the Committee of Union and Progres
supported centralism and Turkish predominance, and did so all the more
vigorously in reaction to Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in 1908, and to Bulgaria's declaration of independence in 1908.
24Lewis, Modern Turkey
,
212-14; Ramsaur, The Young Turks
, 147
THE EMERGENCfc; OF ARABISM
llic Young Turk promises of constitutional govornrnent , of more
liberal institutions, and of equal rights for the subject n;jtional ities
could not check the separatist tendencies within the Empire. The Balkan
nationalities were not amenable to Ottoman reform, no matter how
judicious, for they sought complete separation from Ottoman rule. On
the other hand, the Arabs desired sincere and equitable reform within
the Ottoman system. Yet they gradually became disaffected with the
Young Turks after the latter fall<':d to make good the promises of the
1908 Revolution and, more significantly, after they adopted a policy
of central ization.
The primary aim of the Young Turks v;as to preserve the integrity
of the Ottoman Empire. This had been their principal reason in over-
throwing the incompetent regime of Abdul Haraid, and it became their
most important concern as Ottoman irulers. They were basically conservative
in outlook with little inclination to bring about social change.^
Once in pov/cr the Young Turks v/ere divided into the same to
opposing camps that had characterized their prc-Rcvolution dissension.
Those supporting a greater measure of local autonomy and following
Prince Sabaheddin's program of decentralization were opposed by the
H-'croz Ahmad, Thc_Yojun^; Turks: 'ihc Coinmittee of Union and Progress
In Turkish Politics , 1908-1914 (London, 1969), 15.
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nationalist wing (mostly military) which advocated greater centralization
and Turkish domination. The failure of the 1909 counter-revolution
made the nationalists, whose instrument was the Committee of Union and
Progress, the real rulers of Turkey and, at the same time, it helped to
discredit the pro-decentralization faction because of its support of
the counter-revolution. The power of the Committee of Union and.
Progress and the case for centralization V7ere strengthened in reaction
to both internal and external events, which are summarized by George
Antonius
:
The separatist forces at work in the Balkan provinces
were in the ascendant, the covetousness of two
European Powers lurked menacingly behind a thin
diplomatic veil, and a series of disasters occurred
before the Young Turks had had time to prove their
worth: the annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in October 1908, the simultaneous
secession of Bulgaria, Italy's aggression on Libya
in the autumn of 1911 and the Balkan War of 1912.
In those few years, the Ottoman Empire lost all of
its provinces in Europe (except for eastern Thrace);
that part of Libya which comprised the provinces of
Tripoli and Benghazi; Crete and the islands of the
Dodecanese. In addition to the territorial losses,
a burden of military expenditure had to be incurred
which made serious inroads on Turkey's budgetary
resources
These humiliating setbacks consolidated the trend toward centralization,
and moreover they made the idea of Turkif ication "practical politics."
Turkif ication was a movement to rely primarily on the loyalty of the
Turkish element within the Ottoman Empire and to convert the Empire into
a Turkish state. This idea, promoted by a group of Turkish intellectuals
since 1909, was adopted by the Committee of Union and Progress as state
^Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (London, 1968), 213-217.
^George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York, 1946), 105.
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policy during and after the Balkan Wars.^ The evolution of Ottoraanism
into Turkism is described by Albert Hourani as follows:
The starting-point of the process was the idea that
the only way to resolve the inherent dilemma of the
empire was to impose a single national sentiment
on it; but it gradually grew clearer that Ottoman
national sentiment could not play this role, for it
was too fragile and artificial, and rested ultimately
on nothing except loyalty to the ruling family.
*rhe only effective nationalism was that which was
rooted in some objective unity such as language or
race, and thus Ottoman nationalism gradually turned
into Turkish nationalism.
The rising Turkish nationalism strained Arab-Turkish relations.
Arab hopes for equal rights had been disappointed when the Committee of
Union and Progress rigged the first parliamentary election in 1908 so as
to ensure the election of a majority of its supporters, and also when it
seized control of the central government, restricting it to Turkish
elements. Arab grievances against the Young Turks mounted when they
dismissed the Arab officials connected with the Hamidian regime, and
when th^ purged the decentralization elements that supported the 1909
counter-revolution.^
Moreover, the policy of Turkif ication severely aggravated Arab
disenchantment with Young Turk rule. The attempt by the Young Turks to
impose the use of the Turkish language in the schools, in the courts of
law, and in the government positions of the Arabic-speaking regions met
with determined opposition. To the Arabs, Arabic was a special and
^Great Britain, Foreign Office, Historical Section, The Rise of
the Turks and the Pan-Turanian Movement (London, 1920), 80, 81, 84.
^Albert Hourani, Arabic ThouRht in the Liberal Ape. 1798-1939
(London, 1962), 281
.
Slassan Sa'ab, The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman Empire
(Amsterdam, 1958), 21 9-21.
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sacred language used as the medium for God's Revelation in the Sacred
Qur'an.^
In 1913, after troubled years of domestic and foreign conflicts,
the Committee of Union and Progress had firmly seized power, marking
the decisive triumph of nationalism over constitutionalism. From then
until the Ottoman collapse in 1918, the Empire was governed by a Turkish
military dictatorship, which suppressed parliamentary opposition and
8
applied Hamidian-1 ike controls against dissent.
Turkish nationalism helped to consolidate the development of Arab
national consciousness. The Arabs had not constituted a national entity
since the collapse of Umayyad rule in the middle of the eighth century.
But now in reaction to Turkification, Arabs grew jealous of the special
place v;?iich their language and ethnicity had given them in Islam. In
the Ottoman Parliament, Arab representatives formed a close group to
9
protest the threat imposed on their language and political rights.
We have already seen how Arab pride in their culture was stimulated
by the works of Abduh, Rida, and Kawakibi, as well as by the activities
of Arab cultural and literary fraternities. But we must emphasize that
the programs of the abovementioned (with the exception of Kawakibi),
while stimulating Arab consciousness, were intended primarily to promote
reform within the Ottoman system. The only program of pre-Young Turk
years that advocated the establishment of an independent, political
Arab state was the one proposed by Azoury. We have already noted how
slight its impact was on Muslim Arabs.
^Ibid., 220; Zeine N. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Nationalism
(Beirut, 1966), 98-99.
^Lewis, Modern Turkey , 225.
^Sa'ab, Arab Federalists, 219.
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Likewise, the Arab literary and political societies that developed
in opposition to the Young Turks' programs of centralization and Turkifi-
cation were geared, for the most part, toward reform, not separatism.
However, the post-1908 Arab societies differed from the earlier literary
clubs and from the Islamic reformers in that they espoused well-defined
political objectives. These Arab societies became the leading spokesmen
for Arab rights, calling for the preservation of the use of Arabic in
the schools, lawcourts, and public offices of the Arab provinces, for
autonomy and administrative decentralization, and, in certain cases, for
dual government with the Turks. '^^ The Arab nationalist movement, however,
was not fully consolidated until after the Arab Revolt of 1916 and the
establishment of the Syrian National Congress at Damascus in 1919.
The Arab organizations were small bodies which predominantly
comprised Muslims of the upper classes, such as public officials. Islamic
reformers, university students, and military officers. Because of
Ottoman governmental repression, some of these organizations had to
function underground, and hence were unable to publicize their views,
12
thus reducing their potential for popular support.
13
The first of these Arab societies was al-Ikha al-Arabi al-Uthmani
^^Zeine, The Emergence , 83.
^Unis Sayigh, al-Hiwar (Beirut, 1964), 119.
^^Elie Kedouri, "Hizb," Encyclopedia of Islam (2nd ed.), Ill, 519.
l%or information on these societies, their founders, and their
objectives, see Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 102-119; Richard Hartmann,
•'Arabische Politische Gesellschaf ten bis 191V' in Richard Hartmann and
Helmuth Schcel (eds.), Beitrage^zu^
wissenschaf t (Leipzig, 1944), 439-67; La^jVej^^^ Syrienne
(Constantinople, 1916).
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(The Ottoman Arab Brotherhood), which was founded in Constantinople in
1908 mainly by Syrian officials and notables. This society, as its
name implies, sought to create cooperation and harmony between the Arab
provinces and the Ottoman Government. It supported the Constitution and
it professed its loyalty to the sultan. Nevertheless, it did focus a
good deal of its attention on Arab aspirations. It not only promoted
cultural interests of the Arabs, but moreover, it advocated the guarantee
of Arab rights, the improvement of conditions in the Arab provinces, and
the preservation of the use of the Arabic language. Al-Ikha lasted for
only a few months before it was dissolved as a result of the Young Turks'
prohibition of the formation of political associations.^^
In 1909, al-Muntada al-Adabi (The Literary Club), another Arab
association, was founded in Constantinople by a group of officials and
students. It established branches in various towns of Syria and Iraq,
gaining a relatively large membership. It was tolerated by the Committee
of Union and Progress because it was ostensibly a non-political society,
although many of its activities and programs had political overtones. It
was ordered dissolved by the Ottoman authorities in March 1915.^^
Of greater importance was Hizb al»Lamarkaziyyah al-Idariyyah al-
Uthmani (the Ottoman Party of Administrative Decentralization), which
was established in Cairo in 1912 by a number of prominent Syrian and
Lebanese emigres; chief among them were Rashid Rida and Rafiq al-Azm, its
president and a member of a well-known Muslim family of Damascus. This
^^Antonius, Th e Arab Awakening, 102 and 105; Hnrtmann, "Arabische
Politischc Gcsselschnf ten," 448-A9; La Verite sur la Question Syriennc ,
11-13
^\ntonius. The Arab Awakening , 108-109; Hnrtmann, "Arabische
Politischc Gesselschaften," 450-51; La Verite, 14-22.
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party established branches in many Syrian towns and, according to
Antonius, it "had become the best organized and most authoritative
spokesman of Arab aspirations." Its objectives, as its name implies,
called for the decentralization of authority and for self-government in
the Arab provinces. "^^ These aspirations, however, were dashed as a
result of the triumph of centralized rule under the Committee of Union
and Progress.
A group with similar aims as those of Hizb al^-Lamarkaziyyah
, and
one that acted in close contact with it was founded in Beirut in 1913.
i
It was called the Committee for Reform, and it was composed of 86 i
)l
members, who were almost evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. ^'
1
The Beirut Committee, like Hizb al-Lamarkaziyyah
,
principally demanded
administrative decentralization in the Arab provinces, equal rights and
opportunities for Arabs, recognition of Arabic as an official language
in government and in schools, and the prohibition of conscripting
soldiers to serve outside of their native provinces in peace time.^^
However, there was a unique aspect about the Beirut Committee's
program, namely, the proposal to appoint European counselors to the
various departments in the Beirut province. This proposal was introduced
in the program by Maronite and other Christian members of the Committee.
It is particularly significant because it demonstrates that some Lebanese
Christians were more hospitable to the prospect of French protection
than they were to the idea of Ottoraanism, and moreover that they were
l^Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 109; Hartmann, "Arabische Politische
Gesellschaften," 453ff; La Verite , 58-67.
l^sylvia G. Haim, Arab Nationalism: An Anthology (Los Angeles,
1962), 32-33; Hartmann, "Arabische Politische Gesellschaften," 457-59;
Sa'ab, Arab Federalists, 231-32; Zeine, The Emerp.ence, 102.
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not Arab nationalists. This proposal was attacked by Muslim members




The Beirut Committee for Reform was ordered dissolved by the government
in April 1913. Many shops in Beirut closed in protest, and newspapers
appeared with a copy of the order of dissolution framed in borders of
black as their sole contents. Though severely hampered, the Beirut
Committee continued to function, and it sent representatives to the Arab
Congress held in Paris in June 1913.
Meanwhile in Iraq, Arab anti-Ottoman activity gradually was gaining
momentum. The Turkification program of the Ottoman Government caused
severe discontent in Iraq, as it had in the other Arabic speaking provinces.
Arab pride was shaken as a result of the policy of replacing Arabic
with Osmanli in schools and in government. The improvement and extension
of the Ottoman system of transportation and communication meant firmer
central control, depriving local Arab notables of many traditional
prerogatives. The secularization reforms of the Young Turks upset the
20
power and influence of many religious leaders.
As it happened one of the most potent stimuli for the Arab
nationalist movement in Iraq was provided by Sayyid Talib, the son cf the
naqib al^ashraf of Basra. Sayyid Talib, like Kawakibi and numerous other
ashraf elements, was moved by personal and not ideological motives to
hostility towards the Ottoman Government. Its centralization program
^^Ibid .
^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening, 113; Zeine, The Emergence, 103-104.
^^Philip W. Ireland, Iraq: A Study in Political Development
(London, 1937), 228.
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imposed a threat on his family's hereditary status of privilege and
power. Moreover, it rejected his scheme to establish himself as the
ruler of al-Hasa and of a large portion of Central Arabia. In view
of these circumstances, it may be concluded that Sayyid Talib used the
cause of Arab nationalism largely as an instrument to express his
frustrations against the Ottoman Goveimment, and to pursue his ambition
of carving out a region of the Empire for himself.
Sayyid Talib organized a meeting of leading Arabs in February 1913
to draft a demand for autonomous government for Basra. One month later
he attended an Arab Conference which resolved to work for the self-
govenment or the independence of Iraq. Members of Hizb al-Lamarkaziyyah
in Syria and Egypt, with whom Sayyid Talib already had been in contact,
22
were informed of the Conference's decision.
Constantinople's response to the demands of the nationalists of
Iraq was to tighten the espionage system and to arrest a number of Arab
leaders. In reaction Sayyid Talib increased his anti-Ottoman activity
by organizing the Basra Reform Society, to which an adjunct was formed
in Baghdad led by Muzahim Amin al-Pachaji. The membership of the Reform
Society comprised mostly Arab army officers and local notables, embittered
by the challenge imposed on their positions by Turkish personnel. It
issued proclamations bitterly attacking the Ottoman Government, and
exhorting the Arabs to arise against Ottoman tyranny and to create an
independent Iraq.^^





Ibid., 236; Kedourie, "Hizb," 520; Zeine, The Emergence,
108-109.
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On the whole, however, the Arab movement in Iraq lagged behind
nationalist activity in Syria and Lebanon. Iraq did not possess comparable
educational facilities and stimulus of new ideas introduced through trading
and missionary activities, for its geographical position and poor com-
munications separated it from the West. Its minorities did not attract
in significant measure European protection. In social composition,
Iraq was a semi-feudal rural domain with a small educated urban elite,
such as teachers, writers, lawyers and doctors, elements which constituted
the foundation of Arab nationalism in the Western Fertile Crescent.
However, the lack of an influential literate elite in the Arab movement
of Iraq was somewhat compensated by the important role in the movement of
the Iraqi Arab army officers in the Ottoman army. They were the largest
group in Iraq exposed to Western thought as a result of Westernized
military education, and as such they were capable of communicating on
25
the political level of the various Arab organization.
26A number of secret societies with clearly avowed nationalist aims,
in contrast to the public Arab organizations already discussed, were founded
by Arab nationalists in the years between the Young Turk Revolution and the
outbreak of the First World War. The most important ones were al-Qahtaniyya
al-Jam'iyyat al-Arabiyya al-Fatat (The Young Arab Society), and al-Ahd (The
Covenant). Al -Qahtaniyya and al-Ahd were founded successively by Arab milita
officers serving in the Ottoman array and were led by Aziz al-Misri,
^^Ireland, Iraq , 227-28.
^^For data on these Arab secret societies, see Antonius, The Arab
Awakening
,
llOff; Hartmann, Arabische Politische Gesellschaf ten," 451-67;
Kedouri, "Hizb," 519-20; La Verite sur la Questions Syrienne , 23-28.
^^Named after Qahtan, a legendary ancestor of the Arabs.
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an army officer of Egyptian birth who had participated as a member of
the Committee of Union and Progress in the 1908 Revolution. Whereas
al-Qahtaniyya had a large proportion of civilians, al-Ahd was composed
almost entirely of army officers, who were predominantly Iraqis, the
most numerous Arab element in the Ottoman army. Both associations
advocated the same program: the division of the Ottoman Empire into a
Turko-Arab Empire on the Austro-Hungarian model. Al-Qahtaniyya
. started
in Constantinople in 1909, broke up about one year later because of
the fear that it had been betrayed to the Turks. Al-Ahd also was
established in Constantinople in 1913 or 1914. Since it functioned in
absolute secrecy, information is lacking on the action it may have taken
to attain its objective of a dual monarchy. However, we do know more
about its activity at the time of the outbreak of the First World War,
and we shall discuss its political aims vis-a-vis the war together with
those of al-Fatat .
Like al-Ahd
,
al-Fatat played a significant part in the Arab movement
It was started in Paris in 1909 by seven Muslim students, mainly Syrian.
After several years, its center of activity was shifted to Beirut and
later to Damascus. As George Antonius observed, al-Fatat was to the
Arab intellectual what al-Ahd was to the Arab army officer; yet neither
group knew of the existence of the other until they established contact
early in 1915. The policital objective of al-Fatat was Arab independence
But other than that we know very little of its transactions until the
war years. Once again, it is difficult to have knowledge of the scope
and the effectiveness of a secret association. However, we have reports
that al-Fatat took the initiative in calling the Arab Congress which
69.
met in Paris in June 1913.^^
The Arab Congress of 1913 v;as attended by 24 delegates who repre-
sented a number of the various Arab societies. The delegates were
predominantly Syrian, and roughly half were Muslims and half Christians.
They formulated a general platform of Arab demands in which they re-stated
the principles of decentralization, calling for administrative autonomy
for the provinces, equal rights for Arabs, and the recognition of Arabic
as an official language in Parliament, as well as in local government
and local schools. There was no discussion of separatism; emphasis was
placed on the need for reform within the Empire. In fact, the Congress
reaffirmed its loyalty to the Ottoman Empire, and it cautioned vigilance
29
not against the Empire, but against foreign intervention. The
essential aims of the Congress are summarized in the following excerpt
from the address of the delegate Iskandar Ammun:
The Arab Ummah (nation) does not want to separate
itself from the Ottoman Empire... All that it desires
is to replace the present form of government by one more
compatible with the needs of all the diverse elements
which compose that Empire, in such wise that the in-
habitants of any Province (vilayet ) will have the final
word in the internal administration of their ovm affairs...
At first it seemed that the Ottoman Government V70uld come to terms
with the demands of the Arab Congress. It sent a delegate to negotiate
with the Arabs in Paris, and an agreement was reached whereby a number
of important concessions were made to the Arabs. The gains achieved by
^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 11-12; Kedourie, "Hizb,'' 519.
^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 114-15; Hourani, Arabic Thought,
283-84; Sa'ab, Arab Federalists, 233; Zeine, l^he Emergence, 104-105.
^Voted in Zeine, The Emergence, 105, from al-Mu'tamar al-Arabi
al-Awwal, 103-104.
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the Arabs, however, were illusory. "The concessions had been scaled
down considerably," states Antonius, "and most of what was left was
31
hedged with reservations and ambiguity."
Ottoman refusal to compromise with Arab demands, compounded with
the negative effects of Turkif ication, caused the rift between Arab
leaders and Constantinople to become hopelessly wide. Nevertheless,
with the exception of a small number of Arab army officers and intellectuals,
Muslim Arabs generally did not aspire for independence. For most of
them, traditional Islamic loyalties still transcended national sentiments;
they supported in all conscience the Sultan and the Empire as lineal
successors of the caliphate and as protectors of Sunni Islam.
Moreover, some of the most vociferous groups seeking independence
from the Turks did so not as Arab nationalists, but as regional
nationalists. This was the case with the Lebanese nationalists, mostly
Maronite Christians, who sought to make their autonomous sanjak an
enlarged independent nation backed by French support. We already have
mentioned that the Beirut Committee for Reform was more of a Lebanese
than an Arab nationalist association. Also, there was a small but
important group of Syrian nationalists, mainly Christian, who
advocated
the creation of a secular national Syrian state. The chief
exponents
of the "Syria idea" were Shukri Ghanim and Georges Samne,
both located
32
in Paris where their idea received the support of the
Quai d'Orsay.
Egypt, which was pursuing its own nationalist course,
did not share
in the incipient Arab cause. Egyptians often
considered the Arabs of
Asia foreigners, and Egyptian nationalist spokesmen
like Abdullah al-Nadim
^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 116
^^Hourani, Arabic Thought, 285-87.
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and Mustafa Karail sometimes attacked the Syrian intruders settled in
33Egypt, Egyptian national aspirations emerged in reaction to British
domination, and were primarily concerned with preserving Egypt for the
Egyptians. Whereas Arab nationalists sought independence from the
Ottoman Empire, Egyptian nationalists looked upon the Empire as their
natural ally against the British protectorate. Egypt did not participate
in the cause of Arab nationalism until 1938/39.^^
The limited scope of Arab nationalism at the outbreak of World War
I is brought into clearer focus once we have considered that Egypt and
Lebanon followed separate nationalist roads, as well as the fact that a
good number of Arab groups did not seek independence from the Turks,
but rather autonomy, or administrative decentralization, or dual government
as the ideal solution, furthermore, the total number of Arab nationalist
leaders was small. Ihe Arab cause had hardly any support from the masses,
for, as we have reiterated, they remained passively acquiescent, if not
loyal to Ottoman authority. Professor C. Ernest Dawn has undertaken a
statistical study of the size of the Arab movement before October 1914.
The results of his investigations are as follows:
Only 126 men are known to have been public advocates
of Arab nationalism or members of Arab nationalist
societies before October 1914... Of the 126 Arab
nationalists, 51 can be identified as Syrian; one was
Egyptian, 21 Lebanese, 18 Iraqi, 22 Palentinian





196; Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (London,
1964), 81.
^^For the activities of the Egyptian nationalists at the end of
the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth, see
Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., ''The Egyptian Nationalist Party, 1892-1919,"
in Peter M. Holt (ed.), Political and Social Change in Modern E^;^
(London, 1968), 308-33; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought , 196-209.
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The 126 Arabs who were members of the Arab societies or
prominent spokesmen for the Arab cause we may regard
as the leadership of Arab nationalism. They also make
up a significant percentage of the total number of known
active partisans of Arabism before 1914. An indication
of the spread of Arabism is provided by the signatures
to the telegrams of support which were sent to the Arab
Congress in Paris in June 1913. A total of 387 names
appear on these telegrams.
A closer look at the social status of these Arab nationalists will
reveal some of the principal factors motivating their political aspirations.
The nationalist advocates were predominantly upper class Muslims,
chiefly army officers and intellectuals. The role of the Christian
Arabs in this particular period of the Arab movement was relatively
36
small. The nationalist aims of this privileged Muslim minority
originally derived more from personal interests than from theories on
Arabism. Their resentment of Hamidian and especially Young Turk
encroachments on their traditional power and influence took the form of
a nationalist reaction which was converted into an effective vehicle
for pursuing their self-interested political objectives. That the cause
of Arab nationalism among its very exponents had not yet superseded
personal ambitions at the time of the First World War is well stated in
the following passage taken from Philip W. Ireland's Iraq: A Study in
Pol itical Development :
In spite of the correspondence and interchange of
views between the various sections of the Arab
world, in spite of the manifestos and literature
issued in the name of the Arab peoples, in spite of
the essential unity of the aims and purposes of
Arab Nationalism, the movement tended to break into
sectionalism, limited by the horizons of immediate
locality. The rank and file of the Movement, no
less than the sectional leaders, regarded with
^^C. Ernest Dawn. "The Rise of Arabism in Svria." Middle East





mistrust any leaders whose ascendancy seemed to
overshadow their own interests and to detract from
their own importance. Personal rivalries, religious
differences and sectional animosities thus hampered
the progress of the Movement, stultifying its efforts
and nullifying its effectiveness.^^
Arab nationalism was a force of only moderate importance during the
First World War, and it had relatively little influence on the origin
of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. Al-Fatat and al-Ahd > the
two most important Arab nationalist societies during the war, followed
a "wait and see" course after the Ottoman Empire had entered the war on
the side of the Central Powers. While they sought to exploit the war-
time opportunities to achieve the independence of the Arab countries,
still they hesitated to break away from the Empire. They feared that
their chances for independence vjould be destroyed in the event of a
38German victory, which seemed probable in 1915. On the other hand, they
feared that by abandoning Ottoman protection they would leave themselves
open to the possibility of Allied encroachments. The nationalist
desire to revolt, held in check by the fear of European imperialist
designs, is summarized in the following resolution passed by al-Fatat in
late 1914:
In consequence of Turkey's entry into the War, the fate
of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire is seriously
imperilled and every effort is to be made to secure their
liberation and independence; it being also resolved that,
in the event of European designs appearing to materialise,
the society shall be bound to work on the side of Turkey
in order to resist foreign penetration of whatever kind
or fonn.
37Ireland, Iraq , 237.
^^C. Ernest Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca al-Husayn Ibn Ali and the
Origin of the Arab Revolt," Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society, CIV, 1 (February, 1960), 23.
^^Quoted in Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 153.
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Similarly, Aziz Ali al-Misri told the leadership of al-Ahd not to
consider a revolt against the Ottoman Empire without first obtaining an
effective guarantee against European ambitions on Arab territories.^^
The preponderating fear of foreign intervention on the part of the
Arab nationalists helps to illustrate, once again, the divergence
between Muslim and Christian Arab national aspirations. While a good
number of Arab Christians, particularly the Maronites of Lebanon, sought
French protection, the spokesmen for the greater part of the rest of
the population, namely the Muslim Arabs v;ho constituted the vast
majority, strictly opposed European interference.^^
The Arab nationalists, thinking to wait until the course of the
war decisively went against the Turks before breaking with them, lost
/ 0
the initiative and opportunity of leading a national war of independence.
Once the nationalists had temporized, they were never able to regain
the opportunity of spearheading an anti-Ottoman mutiny. They were
effectively stifled both by the "witchhunt'' conducted by Jamal Pasha,
the Turkish military governor of Syria, and by the transfer from Syria
of Arab military units, which comprised most of the members of the
nationalist society al-Ahd .^-^ Jamal Pasha, besides ordering the arrest
or deportation of hundreds of suspected nationalists, had 11 prominent
Arabs hanged after a summary trial in August 1915, and 21 more without
^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 155.
^llbid.
, 153 and 155.
^^Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca," 23-24; George E. Kirk, A Short History
of the Middle East (New York, 1964), Appendix II, 313.
^^Antonius, Hie Arab Awakening , 188; Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism
in Syria," 151.
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a forroal trial in May 1916.^^ His own words bear testimony to the
effectiveness of his repressive measures in suffocating a potential Arab
rising: "I am certain that to the executions in April 1916 alone do we
owe the fact that there was no rising in Syria during the two-and-a-half
years following Sherif Hussein's declaration of independence. "^^ Yet
the most effective security device probably was the transfer of Arab
troops, for the success of an anti-Ottoman mutiny depencied ultimately on
the military.
The comparative insignificance of the nationalist leaders to the
Arab Revolt of June 1916 was matched by the minimal popular support
that the Revolt attracted. This was due only partly to the proficiency
of Turkish repression. An at least equally important reason for the
failure of the Revolt to win massive support is that the nationalist
idea, aspiring to an independent pan-Arab state, had not as yet attached
the allegiance of a considerable body of Arabs.
The Arab Revolt, far from being the nationalist struggle that it
has been sometimes considered, actually affected just a small number of
Arab nationalists. Only some 20 to 30 nationalists in Syria, according
to Professor Dawn, took part in Arab political or military activity during
the war. Moreover, some elements in the nationalist societies continued
to advocate Arab-Turkish cooperation.^^ The most prominent case of a
^'^Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 188; Ireland, Iraq , 224n; D. A.
w, "Djemal Pasha," Encyclopedia of Islam (2nd ed.), II, 531.





"The Amir of Mecca," 25; Dawn , "The Rise of Arabism in
Syria
47Dawn , "The Rise of Arabism in Syria ," 150-51.
member of an Arab organization vho continued to strive for the pre-war
objective of Arab autonomy vithin the Ottoman Empire was that of Aziz
Ali al-Misri, the founder of al-Ahd and the appointee as Chief of Staff
of the Arab army in September 1916. In a revealing interview with Majid
Khadduri in April 1958, al-Misri stated that "he was unaware of Sharif
Husain's objectives," and that "he had intimated to Sharif Husain that
he was not in favor of full separation from the Ottoman Empire and that
he was of the opinion that the Arabs should be satisfied with an autonomous
status within the Empire." Al-Misri eventually withdrew from the Arab
Revolt and escaped to Germany, after he had learned that Husain intended
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to make a complete break with the Ottoman Empire.
The Arab Revolt had even less effect in the other Arab countries
than it had in Syria, which, after all, was the center of the Arab
movement. In Iraq, as in Syria, Turkish military repression caused the
arrest, deportation, or execution of nationalist leaders, as v/ell as the
transfer of most of the members of al-Ahd to "safe" districts in the
Empire. Furthermore, the British, particularly after they had occupied
Baghdad, blocked news of the Revolt in order to smother nationalist
aspirations in Iraq, and to work instead at consolidating their ov;n
position for their eventual annexation of Lower Iraq.^^
^^Majid Khaduri, "Aziz Ali al-Misri and the Arab Nationalist Movement
in Albert Hourani (ed.), St. Anthony's Papers , No. 17 (New York, 1965),
152-53.
^^Ibid ., 154-55.
^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 204; Ireland, Iraq, 239-40.
^^Ireland, Iraq, 240.
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The Egyptian nationalists of course did not support the Arab Revolt,
for, as we have stated above, their prime enemy was not the Ottoman
Empire, but Britain. Therefore, they naturally backed the Ottoman Empire
and Germany in the war in their hope of ridding Egypt of the British
S2protectorate.
Probably the most significant contribution of the Arab nationalist
groups to the June 1916 Revolt was their proposals advocating an Arab
uprising which they sent to Sharif Husain, the Amir of Mecca. A similar
plan had been unsuccessfully advanced in 1911, when 35 Arab representatives
of the Ottoman Parliament sent a letter with Sayyid Talib to Sharif Husain,
in vjhich they declared that they would revolt under his leadership
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against the Turks and recognize him as caliph. In January 1915, the
leaders of al-Fatat and al^^Ahd sent Fauzi al-Bakri, a member of a
prominent Syrian family, to Mecca to propose that Husain assume the leader-
ship of an anti-Turkish mutiny of Arab troops in Syria led by officers
who were members of al-Ahd .^^ A few months later al-Fatat and al^Ahd
jointly sent Husain, through his son Faisal, a protocol in which they
stated their war-time political objectives. The Damascus Protocol
called for an Arab revolt in alliance with Britain on the condition that
the latter would recognize the independence of the Arab countries.
52For an account of Egyptian nationalism in the first decades of
the twentieth century, see references in footnote 34 above.
^^Hartmann, "Arabische Politische Gesellschaften," 457; Houranl,
Arabic Thought , 284.
^^Antonius, The Arab Awakening , 149-50; Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca,"
22; Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East: the Destruction of the
Ottoman Empire (London, 1965), 58-59.
^^The Damascus Protocol is quoted in full in Antonius, The Arab
Awakening , 157-58.
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However, neither the activities of the Arab nationalists nor their
projected ideal of an independent Arab state brought about the Arab
Revolt. The catalyst for the Revolt was provided by Sharif Husain,
who, however, in leading the anti-Turkish uprising, acted not from Arab
nationalist motives, but instead out of family interests. Husain, a
descendant of the Prophet and a hereditary ruler of the Holy Places,
bitterly opposed Turkish attempts to extend stronger control over the
Hijaz. He v;as supported by the Arab bedouin who assailed the construction
of the Hijaz Railway as disastrous to the livelihood they derived from
the pilgrimage caravans.
Husain* s central political objective v/as to secure Ottoman
recognition of his house as the hereditary autonomous Amirate in the
Hijaz. The ideal of a pan-Arab state was at best a secondary concern.
Husain assured the Ottoman Government of his loyalty on several occasions,
and he even promised to send volunteers in support of its war effort if
58Constantinople would guarantee his political aspirations in the Hijaz.
In fact, Husain accepted 50,000 to 60,000 pounds in gold from the Ottoman
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Government in order to equip the volunteers that he was expected to send.
But as it became clear to Husain that Constantinople would not
support his political aims, he decided to come to a definite agreement
with the British about mid-March 1916 on the basis of the ambiguous and
controversial terms of the Husain-MacMahon Correspondence, which had been
^^Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca," 14, 20, 21.
^^Ibid. , 28.
^^Djemal Pasha, Memories , 201-202, 213.
^^Ibid., 220-21.
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conducted over a period from July 1915 to January 1916.^^ Yet even as
Husain was discussing the details with the British over the eventual
Revolt, he continued to carry out negotiations with the Ottoman authoritie
As late as April 1916, just two months before the Revolt was proclaimed,
Husain submitted to the Ottoman Government the demands that would first
have to be met before he cooperated with its war cause by sending
volunteers. These most recent demands, however, asked not just for the
Ottoman guarantee of the hereditary autonomous Amirate in the Hijaz,
but also for a general amnesty for the Arab political prisoners and for
62decentralized rule in Syria and in Iraq. The apparent reasons for
these expanded demands were: Husain already had been assured (though in
ambiguous terms) of British support in working for the independence
of the Arab countries; and he had ambitions, which were assiduously
cultivated by the British, of emerging as the leading spokesman and
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possibly the king of the Arabs.
Ultimately, Husain's decision to lead the Revolt was arrived at
only after his proposals were completely rejected by the Ottoman
authorities.^^ The proximate cause that triggered the Revolt in the
Hijaz was the sending of a Turkish force of some 3500 men toward the end
of April to Medina. Although the new Turkish force held up in Medina
^^For the texts of the Husain-MacMahon Correspondence, see Antonius,
The Arab Awakening , Appendix A.
^^Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca," 25«26.
^^Ibid., 26; Djemal Pasha, Memories , 215.
^^Peter Kelt, Egypt and the Fertiie_Cres£ent 1516-1922 (Ithaca, N.
264; Kedourie, England and the Middle East , 52-57.
^^Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca," 27-28; Djemal Pasha, Memories, 216--17.
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was destined for the Yemen to reinforce the Turkish offensive against
the British Protectorate in Aden, Husain and his sons felt certain that
it was intended to suppress them. In May, the Hashimites made hasty
preparations to launch the uprising, and the date for the Revolt was
6 Spushed forward from June 16 to June 10.
The historical facts inform us that the Arab Revolt was not the
culmination of the infant Arab movement. Revolt was decided upon without
direct nationalist influence or without even the consultation of the
nationalists, but only after the possibility of reaching an agreement
with Constantinople had been removed by the latter' s flat refusal to
meet Husain' s demands, particularly the one seeking Ottoman guarantee
of his Amirate in the Hijaz.^^ The political realities of self-interest,
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not the idea of Arab nationalism, motivated Husain's course of action.
However, the ideology that did affect Husain as a Sharif and the
one with which he was sufficiently comfortable to use in order to appeal
to popular support was Islamism. He justified the Revolt to the Muslim
people not on the basis of the right of national self-determination,
but on the basis of the accepted Islamic doctrine sanctioning the right
of rebellion against a ruler who has failed to uphold the Shari'a and
68
thus to satisfy the essential conditions of the caliphate. In this
Dawn, "The Amir of Mecca," 27-28; Djemal Pasha, Memories , 223.
For the story of the Arab Revolt, see Antonius, The Arab Awakening , ch-
10; T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (New York, 1935).





^^C. Ernest Dawn, "Ideological Influences in the Arab Revolt," in
James Kritzeck and R. Bayly Winder (eds.), Thejfcrld of Islam: Studies
In Honor of Philip K. Hitti (New York, 1959), 242, 244-45.
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sense llusain was closely related to the school of Islamic reformers,
such as Abduh, Rida and Kavakibi, who attacked the Turks on religious
and not national grounds, and who called for a rejuvenated Islamic
state and not a secular national state. Also Husain's son Abdullah
approved of the necessity of an Arab rising against the Turks on account
of their failure to execute the Shari'a > Abdullah, unlike his father,
was an avowed advocate of Arabism, but more in the religious than ethnic
sense. Like Rashid Rida by whom he was influenced, Abdullah extolled
the pre-eminence of the Arabs in Islam because they were more genuine
and faithful Muslims than the Turks. Thus he followed the line of the
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Islamic reformers in subordinating Arabism to Islam.
The four proclamations issued by Husain between June 10, 1916
and March 5, 1917 reveal that his mind was centered on "the independence
and integrity of Islam and of its fundamental institutions, the Shari 'a
and the caliphate. It is noteworthy that in his first proclamation,
made on the day the Revolt was declared, Husain appealed to traditional
Islamic sentiments and not to nationalist interests. The substance of
the proclamation, striking in its omission of "Arab" and its repeated
mention of "Muslim", is reported by Antonius as follows:
The proclamation denounced the anti-Muslim practices
of the C.U.P. ... It represented the Revolt as a
religious and national duty, and as a God-given
opportunity for the attainment of independence. It
ended by calling upon all Muslims throughout the world
to follow his example, in discharge of their obli-




^^AntoniuG, The Arab Awakening, 207.
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The ideology animating the Arab Revolt had its source in the
doctrines enunciated in behalf of the defense of Islam by Islamic
reformers such as al-Afghani, Abduh, Rida and Kawakibi* It was an
ideology shaped by the general Muslim cultural reaction to European
domination and by the Muslim counter-hope for a renewed Islamic state
72headed by a universal caliphate.
However, although the theory of Arabism and the Arab nationalists
played a small and rather insignificant part in the origin of the Arab
Revolt, nevertheless the Revolt had substantial influence on the develop-
ment of Arab nationalism. It brought together an Arab army, officered
in part by members of al-Ahd
,
notably the Iraqis Ja'far al-Askari,
Nuri al-Sa'id, and Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi. Al-Ahd participated in the
Allied victory and, with the help of the British, was able to occupy
Syria. After the war the Arab military administration became a government
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and it adopted a program of Arab nationalism.'"'
The crystallization of Arab nationalism, however, as well as the
heated controversy over the war-time negotiations, the post-war settle-
ments, the Zionist claims, and the division of Arab lands into British
and French spheres of influence under the mandate system, fall outside
the scope of this essay. They mark the end of four hundred years of
Ottoman rule and the beginning of a new phase of Arab confrontation with
the Western states.
^^Dawn, "Ideological Influences," 246 and 248.
^-^Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism in Syria," 152.
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CONCLUSION
For centuries Islam had moulded the social outlooks and actions
of the vast majority of Muslim Arabs. Characteristically, the most
influential Muslim Arab reform thinkers of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries formulated their ideas on social change in terms of
Islam. Modernists such as al-Afghani, Abduh, Rida and Kawakibi, as
well as their numerous intellectual successors, advocated a revival of
the pristine truths of classical Islam as the solution to contemporary
social and political problems. They warned that imitation of Western
patterns of culture must be eschewed because they were founded on
"heretical", materialist principles. Religious solidarity was the basis
of pan-Islam, the first major nineteenth century Islamic movement of
thought aimed at the preservation of Islamic integrity against European
domination.
The modern reinterpretation of Islam by writers such as Rida and
Kawakibi gave birth to a theory of Arabism at the turn of the century.
Their zeal in justifying Islam led them to emphasize the pre-eminent
status of the Arabs, which was derived from their historical role in
creating Islam and developing it to its most exemplary state. The




The bond betv/een Arabism and Islam vas not broken even after the
emergence of Arab nationalism in the years following the Young Turk
Revolution of 1908. The idea of a secular Arab state, which was
advocated by a few Christian Arabs, received virtually no support from
Muslim Arabs. The most extreme Muslim Arab nationalists dreamed of a
pan-Arab state based on Islamic precepts and headed by a revived Arab
caliphate. This idea began to gain support from a few Arab leaders
only in reaction to Turkification and Turkish intransigence in dealing
with Arab demands for local rights and a greater share in government
authority. Most of the spokesmen for the Arab cause before the outbreak
of the First World War argued that a decentralized form of government
or regional autonomy would be the best solution to the proliems of the
multi-national Ottoman Empire. Perhaps the Arab leaders would not have
sought complete independence or would not have revolted from the Turks,
if the latter had not pursued a chauvinist course buttressed during the
war-time stress by a policy of cruel repression. Muslim Arabs generally
were reluctant to sever their ties with the Ottoman Empire. It had been
sanctioned by their religion since the early sixteenth century as the
cultural home of the Muslim community. The fact that the Empire was ruled
by a Turkish dynasty did not pose a problem for Muslim Arabs, since
ethnic distinctions between Arabs and Turks were transcended by their
supranational allegiance to Islam.
The oven^?helming majority of Arabs were not nationalists and did not
take part in the Arab Revolt of June 1916. The nationalist movement was
limited mainly to a small minority of the Arab elite. The dominant
faction of the Arab elite remained Ottomanists until the collapse of
the Empire at the end of the First World War. Arab nationalists
and Arab
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Ottomanists differed only in the means proposed to attain the same goal,
that is, the maintenance of the integrity of Islamic culture in the face
of Western incursions. The Arab Ottomanists asserted that Islam could
best be supported by strengthening the Ottoman Empire, whereas the
Arabists argued the necessity of restoring the pre-eminence of the
Arabs as the answer to the predicament of Islam,^
The development of the opposing ideologies of Arabism and Ottomanism,
however, derived not from broad cultural interests but from the tra-
ditional rivalry between members of the Arab elite. Those elements
of the Arab elite whose self-interests were accommodated by the Ottoman
Empire were Ottomanists; those who were without a vested interest in the
Empire became Arabists. ''Thus was a traditional intra-elite conflict,"
2
states Professor Dawn, "defined in terms of a new ideology."
The nucleus of the incipient Arab nationalist movement originally
comprised a dissident minority of the Arab elite whose activities
centered, for the most part, in a few major cities of Syria. The Arab
cause was propelled when the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 left
the Arab Ottomanists and the indifferent Arab masses with no alternative
to Arabism.^ The post-war growth of Arab nationalism was accelerated
and consolidated in reaction to European imperialism, which was disguised
in the form of the mandates system. The Arab movement had remained
embryonic while it had sought independence from the Ottoman Empire,
because the Arab masses and a majority of the Arab elite had been unwilling
to separate themselves from their traditional Islamic state. In contrast,








Arab nationalism realized its potent force vhen it gained extensive
support for its ideal of uniting all the Arab peoples in opposition to
their traditional enemy, the Christian West.
Arab nationalism has become the most popular political ideology
in the contemporary Arab world. It is the principal political mani-
festation of social change in Arab society. Yet the ultimate dream of
the Arab nationalist leaders for the creation of a pan-Arab state has
been shattered by the consolidation of regional nationalisms in the
decades following the Second World War. Furthermore, the question still
remains unanswered whether Arab nationalism can or should be divorced
from Islam. The particularism of the various Arab states, a product of
the bitter rivalry among the different governments, exacerbates the
problem of the compatibility of nationalism and Islam. Many Arabs would
like to believe that their religion and civilization are intertwined.
But only pan-Arabism, which presupposes the unity of the Muslim Arab
community, can give credence to this aspiration. Several attempts
made at Arab unification, however, have been unsuccessful. The Arab
League failed to establish an Arab federation, and the United Arab
Republic proved to be a short-lived experiment in Arab unification.
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